Equity market analysts often speculate about whether US stocks are influenced by the machinations of a presidential election year. In that spirit, with the United States preparing to vote for a president later this year, it’s worth investigating whether returns on high-yield bonds and leveraged loans have been influenced by policies and economic factors unique to presidential election cycles.
Looking at data since 1988, which is the earliest that monthly return data for a presidential election year is available for the US high-yield bond market, LCD discovered from the relatively small sample set that high-yield and leveraged loan market returns do seem to be impacted by presidential election factors.
Equity’s lead
Unquestionably, sitting presidents promote policies and make statements aimed at spurring the economy, asset markets, and ultimately, voters, to raise their chances of winning reelection (or if they’ve already served two terms, of their party retaining the White House). It’s part of their job description to do all they can to perpetuate their party’s grasp on the presidency. But do those actions and statements impact stock market returns for investors during presidential election years? Publicly available information, tapping into many decades of data, shows that historically, during three consecutive years — a presidential election year, the year after the election, and the year after that — the S&P 500 generated roughly the same annual return, in the neighborhood of 5-7% per annum.
To be clear, some studies showed equity market election-year returns edging out year-after returns, while others found the reverse, but on balance the variability was mild. Note that while sources don’t agree on precise returns during each of those three years, they do agree that S&P 500 returns during a president’s third year in office are 2-3x higher on average than the other years. Most recently, the S&P 500’s 24% return in 2023, President Biden’s third year, fit the bill.
LCD conducted its own analysis of S&P 500 returns during presidential election years and the year after, starting with 1988. Unlike with the longer-term equity data, LCD’s shorter data range revealed a definite influence on average annual returns for the year of a presidential election and the year after.
During the 36-year period, the S&P 500 posted an average return of 8.6% per year, compounded annually (omitting dividends). Meanwhile, the average return in a presidential election year was 4.1%, but the average for the year after the election was 17.2%.
By those numbers, it seems that election year policies and statements do not help investors, yet the year following the presidential election produces exceptional returns. Given how markets dislike uncertainty, are the better year-after returns a response to the clarity of the winning administration’s agenda?
Breaking down the results by party yields another interesting outcome. Presidential election-year equity returns were 3.2% when Democrats won, but 5.2% when Republicans won, both below the 36-year annual rate. One might expect the pro-business reputation of Republicans would lead that party’s wins to show up as better equity returns, and indeed, for election years they do.
But that explanation fails for year-after equity returns. When Republicans won, the S&P 500 gained an average of 9.2%, just above the annual average. But when Democrats won, the S&P vaulted ahead in the year after by an average of 23.6% per year, 2.5x the Republican-victory rate.
High-yield market returns
The high yield market showed an election-year and year-after return pattern similar to equities. The ICE BofA High Yield Index returned an average of 7.7%, compounded annually, since 1988. High yield returns during election years is just under that, at 7%, but the average return during the year after each presidential election is 12.7%. As with equities, high-yield returns were pedestrian for the election year, but stellar the year after.
Also similar to the equity markets, the high-yield market since 1988 has displayed a bias for the Republican party during an election year, but a clear preference for Democrats in the year after the election.
During election years, the high-yield market rose 5.3% when a Democrat won but climbed 9.2% when a Republican won. In the year following an election, high-yield gained 19.4% when the Democratic candidate won, nearly 5x the 4.2% average return when a Republican won.
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 had an outsized impact on high-yield market returns, because of the index’s 24.7% loss in election year 2008 and its 54.7% gain in 2009. Because in those years a Democrat won, removing the GFC data would leave Democratic-win returns beating Republican-win returns both in the election year and the year after.
Leveraged loan market returns
The available data history of the leveraged loan market is significantly shorter than for equities and high-yield. It begins with the 2000 election, and so covers only six election cycles. The overall results nonetheless dovetail with those of high-yield and equities.
Leveraged loan market returns since 2000 have averaged 4.9% per year, compounded annually. Returns during a presidential election year averaged only 0.7%. Returns in the year following the election averaged 12.6%. Once again, bulls ran during a president’s first year in office.
Winning-party results for leveraged loans also echo those of the other asset classes. During election years, a Democratic victory coincided with leveraged loan losses of 5.4%, but when a Republican won the market gained 6.8%. For the year after a Democratic victory, loans gained 20.7%, once again almost 5x the 4.5% average return when a Republican won.
As with high-yield, the GFC had an outsized impact on leveraged loan market returns. In the case of this market, removing GFC-years data brought returns when a Democrat won and returns when a Republican won within 35 bps of each other.
Making change
Since more than nine decades of S&P 500 equity returns showed no clear bias in favor of investors during an election year and the year after, but a 36-year time horizon revealed leanings, it raises the question of whether important factors have been omitted, or whether something significant has changed in portfolio management, elections, or both.
For omissions, looking simply at returns ignores whether, during the election year or the year after, the same party occupied both the White House and the two houses of Congress, giving a president more or less influence on legislation. It also omits performance distinctions for whether the incumbent candidate retained the White House, or a new party stepped in. Finally, it leaves out whether the election year or the year after encompassed economic recessions or — equally important — whether either year featured the economy recovering from a recession.
Of note, the recession influence was especially striking during and after the Global Financial Crisis. The Democrats won the presidential election held during 2008, a remarkably difficult investing year and a victory that skewed the election-year-average Democratic-victory returns lower. Meanwhile, 2009’s strong recoveries by all asset classes tilted year-after Democratic-victory results higher.
Moreover, some things have definitely changed. For instance, since the 1990s, fixed income market investors have a better overall information exchange because of Bloomberg and the internet, and since the 2000s, better bond price discovery because of TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). TRACE made trading more efficient by narrowing pricing and trade spreads and enabling investors to see fixed-income market action in near-real time. It is possible that, taken together, they have altered the investing landscape.
The relatively recent advent of ETFs may also be playing an important role. ETFs allow investors to easily take positions in debt indices and sectors with a single trade. Has that ability to express an investing viewpoint somehow altered returns in election years and the year after?
Then there is sample size. For high-yield, is the 36-year, nine-election time horizon simply too short? The same question applies to the 24-year, six-election sample for leveraged loans. Even for equities, with elections every four years, a single outlying data point can have outsized influence on the numbers.
Finally, maybe the broad reputations of the two primary US political parties no longer quite reflect the positions of their candidates. And it is possible that the recent greater divide between the parties, with candidates’ positions more starkly outlined and differentiated from each other than ever before, is translating into changed investment returns.
Featured image: Walter Bibikow/Getty Images
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