This commentary is written by Martin Fridson, a high-yield market veteran who is chief investment officer of Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors LLC as well as a contributing analyst to Leveraged Commentary & Data.
High-yield bonds are on track for their second-worst year on record. Through Oct. 21, the ICE BofA US High Yield Index’s total return was -14.03%. Among all of the index’s full years, 1987-2021, only the Great Recession year of 2008 was more dismal, returning -26.39%.
The reason is not hard to find. Expectations of a recession in 2023 caused projected default rates to rise, and investors consequently became much more risk-averse with respect to credit quality. Between Dec. 31, 2021 and Oct. 21, 2022, the ICE BofA US High Yield Index’s option-adjusted spread (OAS) widened by 189 bps, from +310 bps to +499 bps. What more needs to be said?
Quite a bit, as it turns out. Yes, the 189 bps OAS-widening is a substantial figure. It exceeds the full-year widening in 80% of the years for which OAS is available (1987-2021). An even more impressive statistic, however, is the 323 bps year-to-date increase in underlying Treasury yields, from 1.24% to 4.47%, as measured by the effective yield on the ICE BofA US Treasury Index. That rise exceeds 100% of the year-over-year increases in the series (1987-2021). In fact, it is twice as great as the largest annual jump, 159 bps in 1999.
In short, if you want to apportion blame for the high-yield market’s -18.17% price return (partly offset by 4.14% income, netting to the aforementioned -14.03% total return) assign the majority of the damage to the rise in Treasury yields. The simulation in the chart below breaks down the sources of yield-related price loss on the ICE BofA US High Yield Index, through Oct. 21:
The credit-risk side of the equation must also be charged with default losses. Quantifying them requires some estimation based on data from a different source, Moody’s Investors Service. For the 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2022, the rating agency reported a 1.0% dollar-weighted default rate for US speculative-grade bonds and a 67.2% loss rate (based on post-default prices). That comes to an estimated 0.67% loss rate for the last 12 months. Multiplying that figure by 0.89 years (Jan. 1 to Oct. 21) produces an estimated year-to-date default loss of 0.60%. The imperfections in this calculation have a minimal effect, given the latest-12-months dollar-weighted default rate of just 1.0%.
Let us then add 0.60% to the high-yield index’s -18.17% year-to-date price return, stripping out the default loss and leaving -17.57% attributable to the index’s yield rise. (This calculation omits the impact of changes in the index’s membership from defaults and other causes but those effects, too, should be minor.) The Treasury yield rise thus accounts for 63.1% of the 17.57% HY index price loss that is attributable to the increase in the high-yield index’s effective yield, or 11.09%. Dividing that figure by the total price loss of 18.17% gives us the bottom line: True, increased default risk has taken a toll on high-yield portfolios in 2022, but 61% of the year-to-date loss on the high-yield index is the fault of increases in underlying Treasury yields.
High-yield now somewhat less extremely rich
During September, our credit availability measure, which is reported only once a quarter, remained at 24.3 percentage points. By a hefty margin, more banks were tightening than were easing their standards for companies to qualify for loans. Capacity Utilization nominally increased to 80.3%, from 80.0%. Industrial Production, a lesser factor, improved to 0.4%, from -0.2%. The default rate reported by S&P Global Ratings inched up to 1.5%, from 1.3%, while the five-year Treasury yield, which is inversely correlated with the spread, increased to 4.05%, from 3.28%. Our dummy variable for quantitative easing remained at zero, indicating that QE was not in force during the month.
The actual spread on Sept. 30 of +543 bps, up from +503 bps one month earlier, was 126 bps tighter than the +669 bps fair value figure, which was down from +720 bps in August. That represented a disparity of 1.0 standard deviations. (One standard deviation = 124.5 bps.) The high-yield asset class thus remains in the extremely overvalued range, as illustrated in the chart below, but at least the disparity declined from 1.7 standard deviations in August. On Oct. 21, the high-yield OAS stood at +499 bps, or 170 bps less than fair value.
Note that alternative approaches to determining fair value may come to very different conclusions. Our approach is not based on high-yield’s relative value versus other non-Treasury asset classes. Suppose, for example, that in a given month investment-grade corporates are historically tight in relation to factors such as credit availability and economic indicators. High-yield may then appear fairly valued, or even cheap, vis-à-vis investment-grade, even though rich versus Treasuries.
The valuation findings summarized in the chart above are drawn from the updated methodology presented in a prior piece for LCD titled “Fair value update and methodology review.” In brief, we find that 80% of the historical variance in the ICE BofAML US High Yield Index’s OAS is explained by six variables:
- Credit availability, derived from the Federal Reserve’s quarterly survey of senior loan officers.
- Capacity utilization.
- Industrial production.
- Current speculative-grade default rate.
- Five-year Treasury yield.
- A dummy variable for the period covered by quantitative easing.
Each month we calculate a fair value spread based on the levels of these six variables. The extent of high-yield overvaluation or undervaluation is determined by the difference between the actual OAS and the fair value number (“estimated”). We define material under- or overvaluation as a divergence of one standard deviation (124.5 bps) or more from fair value. The monthly difference between the actual and estimated OAS is tracked in the accompanying chart.
Research assistance by Zhuojun Lyu and Yinuo Lai.
ICE BofA Index System data is used by permission. Copyright © 2022 ICE Data Services. The use of the above in no way implies that ICE Data Services or any of its affiliates endorses the views or interpretation or the use of such information or acts as any endorsement of Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors LLC’s use of such information. The information is provided “as is” and none of ICE Data Services or any of its affiliates warrants the accuracy or completeness of the information.
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