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Distressed & Defaults

Leveraged loan payment default rate eases as LMEs carry on

The payment default rate by amount is now a full point lower than the post-rate-hike cycle peak in July 2023.

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October’s restructuring activity among Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index companies consisted of a bankruptcy filing with a view to resolving mass litigation claims, along with two liability management exercises that prime existing loan lenders.

As of Oct. 31, the trailing 12-month default rates of the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index were as follows:

  • Payment default rate by amount: 0.73%
  • Payment default rate by issuer count: 1.27%
  • Dual-track default rate by issuer count: 4.40%

LCD’s monthly default report features the legacy payment default rate and a dual-track default rate by count that includes index issuers conducting distressed liability management exercises (LMEs). More details and the methodology can be found here.

With a sizable default rolling off the trailing twelve-month calculation, and a new default by body implant manufacturer Exactech, the payment default rate (excluding distressed LMEs) eased to 0.73% in October, from 0.80% in September.

The payment default rate by amount is now a full point lower than the post-rate-hike cycle peak in July 2023 of 1.75%.

By issuer count, the payment default rate inched to 1.27%, from 1.26% in September, and a recent peak of 2.07% in February.

The 10-year average by issuer count is 1.64%, and by amount is 1.67%.

When including out-of-court LMEs and payment defaults, the combined rate by issuer count climbed to 4.40%, nearing the high of 4.42% reached in April.

Out-of-court liability management exercises prompting defaults or ‘Selective Defaults’ continue to climb as companies ride out higher interest rates. October’s trailing twelve-month calculation has risen to 37. This compares to 17 in October 2023, and seven in October 2022.

In contrast, the trailing twelve-month count of payment defaults that make up the legacy default rate remained at 15 in October, versus 22 in October 2023.

As the above chart shows, the default landscape among leveraged loan issuers has flipped in recent years. Defaults via LMEs by trailing 12-month issuer count have outnumbered payment defaults every month since January. Conversely, defaults via interest payment misses or bankruptcy filings outnumbered LMEs in every single month of 2023.

Of course, helping to drive this trend is the Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening policy that increased base interest rates by approximately 5% between March 2022 and July 2023. With the Fed keeping its policy rate in the 5.25%-5.50% range from July, until cutting by 50 bps in September, companies have sought breathing room outside of bankruptcy court ahead of an expected decline in interest rates.

In terms of share of the restructuring landscape, over the last twelve months, LMEs comprise 71% of the count, matching the high watermark of September 2021.

In a look at sectors, Healthcare Equipment & Services and Software & Services continue to top the table, making up 22% and 19% of such activity over the last 12 months, respectively.

Middle market
Taking a closer look at October’s restructuring candidates, joint replacement implant manufacturer Exactech filed for bankruptcy following lawsuits relating to recalled knee and hip implant devices.

According to the first day declaration in the case filed by the company’s chief restructuring officer in Wilmington, Del., bankruptcy court, more than 2,600 patients have filed lawsuits against the company in state, federal, and non-US courts, including a federal multi-district litigation proceeding. While the company contests the merits of these claims, the costs of litigation became an overwhelming burden for the business, court documents show.

The company’s $235 million first-lien term loan B due 2025 was placed as part of TPG Capital’s 2018 take private of the company. Exactech’s Chapter 11 filing marks the first payment default from a middle market company in the index since California Pizza Kitchen’s bankruptcy filing in 2020.

In LME restructurings, STG Logistics transferred roughly half the assets securing its current debt facilities into a new unrestricted subsidiary, which then issued around $191 million of a new first-lien first-out term loan due October 2029 that included $136.5 million of new money, according to S&P Global Ratings in an Oct. 14 report downgrading the company, and its debt, to D.

The new unrestricted subsidiary will also issue a new first-lien second-out term loan, and first-lien third-out term loan to exchanging holders for a portion of their existing claims.

The containerized freight provider in 2022 placed its original $750 million first-lien term loan due 2028 to finance its acquisition of XPO Logistics’ intermodal division and refinance existing debt.

According to S&P, lenders of the existing term loan will receive a discount to par as well as some payment-in-kind (PIK) compensation. Revolver lenders have been offered a par exchange into a first-lien second-out term loan.

“We view this debt exchange as distressed and tantamount to a default, given that lenders either did not receive adequate compensation or will be taking a subordinated position relative to assets securing the company’s new term loan,” Primary Credit Analyst Mayur Bhutani wrote in the report downgrading the issuer.

Finally, broadband service provider WideOpenWest’s B-minus credit rating was slashed to SD after it completed a debt restructuring that, via an amendment to its credit agreement, placed a $200 million super-priority first-lien first-out term loan due December 2028 ahead of existing lenders.

According to an Oct. 18 S&P Global Ratings report, the amendment results in subordination of a significant amount of pre-transaction term loan and revolver commitments.

Rated B-flat as recently as August, the company has faced several headwinds, including subscriber losses for its high-speed data service, and a tight liquidity position (with its $250 million revolving credit facility due December 2026 fully drawn) that made a traditional refinancing expensive at currently higher interest rate costs.

The company placed its $730 million term loan in 2028 as part of a refinancing, pricing the loan at S+300 bps.

Looking ahead, past trends indicate that a significant share of LMEs will return with a full-blown payment or bankruptcy default. The September bankruptcy filing by Wheel Pros, for example, raised the share of companies that have returned with a conventional payment or bankruptcy default after conducting an LME in 2023. Despite the short time frame, 14% of companies that conducted an LME in 2023 have already returned with a payment or bankruptcy default.

During the pandemic default wave of 2020, 27% of issuers returned with a conventional default of missed interest payments or a bankruptcy filing within the next three years.

In 2022, the share of companies returning with a payment default or bankruptcy jumped to 33%.

Private equity sponsor companies, LCD data shows, continue to be the primary driver of LME activity, but are recently outpacing non-sponsored companies for payment defaults as well.

When excluding LMEs, the rate of hard defaults of payment misses and bankruptcy filings among sponsored companies topped that of non-sponsored companies for a second straight month.

Past trends show that during elevated periods of payment and bankruptcy defaults, such as the 2016 uptick in defaults driven by increased oil prices and the 2020 pandemic, sponsored companies typically defaulted at a much lower rate.

The preference of sponsor companies to restructure via LMEs, which typically are more likely to preserve the equity stake held by private equity firms, remains firmly in place. In 2023, sponsor companies drove 91% of LME transactions. In the LTM period, 78% of LMEs were sponsor driven.

Turning to forward indicators, LCD data show stress levels, which can indicate future default activity, remain steady at relatively low levels. The distress ratio, defined as the share of loans below the 80-price distress marker, edged higher to 3.68% in October, from 3.43% in September, but this is down from 5.12% a year ago, and 7.11% in October 2022.

By issuer count, the distress ratio rose to 5.09%, from 4.79% in September.

In 2020, this hit as high as 31%.

More imminently, two index companies were operating under forbearance after missing interest payments in October (LCD’s criteria marks a default if the payment is missed outside of forbearance). These include LifeScan Global Corp, which missed interest and principal payments due Oct. 1 on its third-lien term loan. The company’s first-lien term loan due 2026 is a constituent of the loan Index. Wellpath Holdings (Correct Care), meanwhile, was in forbearance expiring Oct. 31 after it missed interest and principal payments on its first-lien and second-lien term loans, and missed repaying its $65 million revolver. Wellpath’s first lien term loan due 2025 is an index constituent.

Finally, ratings agency activity remains weighted toward downgrades, with the ratio of downgrades to upgrades on a rolling three-month basis rising for a second consecutive month, to 2.23x in October, from 2.21x in September, and 1.94x in August.

This compares to a 2024 low of 1.64x in March, and a recent high of 3.32x in February 2023.

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