Out-of-court liability management exercises dominated the restructuring scene in 2024, outpacing payment and Chapter 11 defaults as companies sought to avoid more costly bankruptcy proceedings and wait out higher interest rates.
As of Dec. 31, the trailing 12-month default rates of the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index were as follows:
- Payment default rate by amount: 0.91%
- Payment default rate by issuer count: 1.45%
- LME default rate by issuer count: 3.25%
- Dual-track default rate by issuer count: 4.70%
LCD’s monthly default report features the legacy payment default rate and a dual-track default rate by count for index issuers conducting distressed liability management exercises (LMEs). More details and the methodology can be found here.
Payment and bankruptcy defaults (excluding LMEs) continued to trend lower in 2024, falling to 0.91% by amount at the end of December and 1.45% by issuer count, down from 1.53% and 2.05%, respectively, at the end of 2023. In the time since the Federal Reserve hiked rates from rock-bottom levels in March 2022, the loan default rate by amount peaked at 1.75% in July 2023 and at 2.07% by count in February 2024.
For the month of December, one issuer (Heubach Group) rolled off the trailing 12-month calculation, while The Container Store, which filed for Chapter 11, was added. This left the loan payment default rate nearly unchanged from November, which recorded default rates of 0.94% by amount and 1.44% by count.
The 10-year average by issuer count and by amount is 1.65%. The historical average is 2.61% by amount and 2.44% by issuer count.
When including four out-of-court LMEs that prompted a downgrade to ‘D’ or ‘SD’, the combined rate with payment defaults climbed to 4.70% in December.
Isolating LMEs, the rate of issuers conducting these transactions as a share of the performing index was 3.25% at year-end, the highest rate since LCD began tracking this metric in 2016.
As the below chart shows, the default landscape among leveraged loan issuers flipped on its head in 2024, with the trailing 12-month count of LMEs outpacing payment defaults and bankruptcies in every month since January.
Conversely, defaults via interest payment misses or bankruptcy filings outnumbered LMEs in every single month of 2023.
Over the past 12 months, 38 index issuers conducting a distressed LME contributed to the dual-track default rate. This compares to trailing-12-month readings of 21 in December 2023 and nine in December 2022.
In contrast, the trailing 12-month count of payment defaults that make up the legacy default rate stood at 17 in December, versus 24 in December 2023.
Of course, helping to drive this trend is the Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening policy that increased base interest rates by approximately 5% between March 2022 and July 2023. With the Fed keeping its policy rate in the 5.25-5.50% range for more than a year before cutting it by 50 bps in September, companies sought breathing room outside of bankruptcy court ahead of an expected decline in interest rates.
In terms of the share of the restructuring landscape, over the last 12 months, LMEs account for 69% of the count. Though elevated, that share is slightly below high watermarks of 71% in October 2024 and September 2021.
Looking at sectors across the LME landscape, there remains a clear dominance among healthcare and software companies, with Software & Services and Healthcare Equipment & Services making up 21% and 18% of such activity over the last 12 months, respectively.
Turning to December’s default activity, home goods retailer The Container Store filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, placing its $163.2 million outstanding term loan B-3 due 2026 into default. Via a transaction support agreement reached with holders of more than 90% of term loan claims, the company will receive around $40 million in new financing and cut its debt by roughly $45 million.
In a first-day declaration filed in the case, Chief Restructuring Officer Chad Coben cited for the filing a persistently challenging retail environment, which resulted in a 10.5% year-over-year decline in revenue and a 77.1% year-over-year drop in adjusted EBITDA for the fiscal quarter ended Sept. 28, 2024. This performance, along with increased interest expenses and looming debt maturities, pressured liquidity.
Selective Defaults
Moving on to LMEs, radio broadcaster iHeartMedia, having previously emerged from bankruptcy in 2019, completed an out-of-court restructuring of roughly 92% of its debt, prompting a company-level downgrade by S&P Global Ratings to Selective Default (SD). Its debt, including two term loans in the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index, was downgraded to D.
In exchange for existing debt held by participating lenders, iHeartCommunications issued new secured debt that extended existing maturities by roughly three years. Commenting on the downgrade, S&P said lenders received less than originally promised and it added that absent a transaction, there was a realistic possibility of a conventional default over the near- to medium-term, meaning the restructuring was distressed and tantamount to a default.
Also in December, Springs Window Fashions, a provider of custom window coverings, issued a new $350 million super-priority first-out term loan, thereby lowering the priority waterfall of security within its exiting capital structure and pushing the new loan holders ahead of its existing term loan lenders.
According to S&P, which lowered the company to SD and its term loan to D, the majority of term loan lenders were offered the right to exchange into a new second-out term loan at 95 cents of par value, and certain unsecured noteholders were offered the opportunity to roll up into a new secured second-lien notes position at 83.84 cents of par value.
“We view this transaction as tantamount to default because the existing term loan and unsecured notes lenders are receiving less than originally promised in the subordination of the security position behind the new money super-priority first-out delayed-draw term loan and the below-par distressed debt exchanges,” the agency stated.
Furthermore, the company carried a large interest burden stemming from its leveraged buyout by Clearlake Capital Group in 2021. The company’s $1.6 billion term loan B due 2025, a constituent of the index, was put in place as part of the 2021 buyout.
S&P on Dec. 18 downgraded Veritas Holdings Ltd. to SD, from CC, following the completion of a debt exchange that was part of Cohesity’s acquisition of the Veritas’ data protection business. The company exchanged its secured term loans and notes due 2025 totaling $4.2 billion outstanding for a pro rata share of a new term loan B carrying cash and paid-in-kind (PIK) interest, a PIK margin loan backed by Cohesity preferred equity interests held by Veritas, as well as Cohesity preferred equity issued directly to creditors. Creditors also receive a partial cash paydown from the data protection asset sale proceeds and a margin loan funded by Cohesity.
While the debt exchange and note tender transaction addressed Veritas’ debt maturities, S&P deemed the transaction as providing less than originally promised, given the priming by the $140 million super-priority revolver, interest deferral on the exchange debt via the PIK component of take-back debt and equitization via the preferred equity interest in a privately held entity.
Finally, flooring company Empire Today exchanged its existing term loan for new first- and second-out term loans at a discount to par, prompting downgrades by S&P of the company to SD and its term loan to D.
In addition to the subordinated position of the second-out participants, Empire also moved its intellectual property assets away from existing term loan lenders, to a new entity that issued the new first- and second-out loans, S&P noted.
Past performance
On the topic of LME transactions, history would imply that a sizable share of these LMEs will return with a conventional payment default via a bankruptcy filing or interest payment miss.
Despite the short timeframe, 14% of companies that conducted an LME in 2023 have already returned with a payment or bankruptcy default.
During the pandemic default wave of 2020, 27% of issuers returned with a conventional default of missed interest payments or a bankruptcy filing within the next three years.
In 2022, the share of companies returning with a payment default or bankruptcy jumped to 33%.
Private equity sponsor companies, typically the driver of LMEs, have recently been outpacing non-sponsored companies for payment defaults as well.
When excluding LMEs, the rate of hard defaults of payment misses and bankruptcy filings among sponsored companies topped that of non-sponsored companies for a fourth straight month in December.
Past trends show that during elevated periods of payment and bankruptcy defaults, such as the 2016 uptick in defaults driven by increased oil prices and the 2020 pandemic, sponsored companies typically defaulted at a much lower rate.
The preference of sponsored companies to restructure via LMEs, which typically are more likely to preserve the equity stake held by private equity firms, remains in place. In 2024, 77% of LMEs were by sponsored companies. In 2023, sponsored companies drove 91% of LME transactions.
Indications
While sentiment for 2025 is favorable among market pros, with expectations of easing credit conditions, tightening spreads and a revival of M&A-related supply, there will be a subset of companies “that can’t outrun interest rates,” providing an opportunity for distressed investors.
Forward indicators are mixed. The distress ratio continues to ease and the maturity wall has been largely surmounted. However, rating agencies are skewing negatively with heightened downgrade activity among loan issuers.
Starting with distressed companies, the distress ratio — which, as the below chart demonstrates, is a forerunner to default activity — eased to 3.02% by par amount in December, the lowest it has been since July 2022. It also sits well below the high of 7.36% in December 2022, ahead of an interest rate-driven uptick in defaults in 2023.
By issuer count, the distress ratio fell to 4.44% in December, the lowest level since August 2022.
Furthermore, in 2024, borrowers reduced the 2025 maturity wall by 84%, to just $13.5 billion, and the 2026 wall by 75%, to $44 billion.
However, ratings agency activity among loan issuers continues to skew more negatively, with the downgrades exceeding upgrades by a ratio of 3x on a rolling three-month basis in December, which is the highest reading for that metric since February 2023.
Featured image: Javier Zayas Photography/Getty Images
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