The trailing 12-month count of bankruptcy and payment defaults continued to trend lower in August, with companies in the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index instead seeking breathing room via out-of-court distressed transactions ahead of a potential rate cut this month.
As of Aug. 31, the default rates of the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index were as follows:
- Payment default rate by amount: 0.78%
- Payment default rate by issuer count: 1.28%
- Dual-track default rate by issuer count: 4.17%
LCD’s monthly default report features the legacy payment default rate and a dual-track default rate by count that includes index issuers conducting distressed liability management exercises (LMEs). More details and the methodology can be found here.
With no new bankruptcy filings or interest payment misses, and with two issuers rolling off the trailing twelve-month calculation, the payment default rate (excluding distressed LMEs) by amount fell to 0.78%, from 0.92% in July. The payment default rate by amount is now 96 bps lower than the post-rate-hike cycle peak in July 2023 of 1.75%.
By issuer count, the payment default rate fell to 1.28%, from 1.45% in July and a recent peak of 2.07% in February. The 10-year average by issuer count is 1.63%.
Out of court
When including out-of-court LMEs and payment defaults, the combined rate by issuer count climbed to 4.17%, from 4.02% in July, which was the lowest for the combined rate since December 2023.
The dual-track rate, at 4.17%, is a quarter of a point lower than the 4.42% April 2024 peak, largely due to a decline in payment defaults and an increase in the number of issuers in the loan index.
Indeed, soft defaults in the form of out-of-court distressed exercises, or LMEs, climbed to an all-time high of 34 in August’s trailing twelve-month calculation. This compares to 15 in August 2023, and four in July 2022.
In contrast, the trailing twelve-month count of payment defaults, or hard defaults, fell to 15 in August, from 22 in August 2023.
As the above chart shows, the default landscape among leveraged loan issuers has flipped in recent years. Soft defaults via LMEs by trailing 12-month issuer count have outnumbered payment defaults every month since January. Conversely, hard defaults of interest payment misses or bankruptcy filings outnumbered LMEs in every single month of 2023.
Of course, helping to drive this trend is the Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening policy that increased base interest rates by approximately 5% between March 2022 and July 2023. Indeed, with the Fed keeping its policy rate in the 5.25%-5.50% range since last July, companies have sought breathing room outside of bankruptcy court ahead of an expected start of interest rate cuts this month.
In terms of share of the restructuring landscape, over the last twelve months, LMEs comprise 69% of the count, up from 47% at the end of 2023, 53% at the end of 2022, and 55% at the end of 2021.
For context, though the current share of LMEs looks historically high, LMEs made up an even higher share of the default landscape in September 2021, at 71%.
Healthcare and Software
Breaking down LMEs among index companies, there remains a clear dominance among healthcare and software companies, with Healthcare Equipment & Services and Software & Services making up 24% and 21% of such activity over the last 12 months, respectively.
Zooming in on August’s restructuring activity, canned food producer Del Monte Foods returned to the restructuring landscape with a recapitalization transaction that, via the issuance of a new super-priority first-out term loan, subordinated the position of the existing term loan. The company also transferred collateral securing its existing term loan to a new wholly owned subsidiary to secure the new term loan.
“We view this transaction as distressed due to the company’s weak operating performance, liquidity constraints, the distressed trading prices of its debt in the secondary market, as well as the junior lien priority of its existing term loan relative to the newly issued tranche,” S&P Global Ratings analyst Arpi Gupta wrote in the Aug. 8 report downgrading the issuer to Selective Default (SD) and the loan to D.
Del Monte also triggered a soft default in the dual-track rate in 2018 when it repurchased about $129 million of its $260 million second-lien term loan due August 2021 at a 30% discount to par.
Next up, Hunter Defense Technologies completed an amendment and extension of its existing credit agreement that, among other things, eliminates the existing springing leverage covenant and implements an amortization holiday for the term loan.
In the report downgrading the company to SD and the term loan to D, S&P noted that it viewed the transaction as a distressed exchange “due to the term loan’s PIK interest nature for the remaining duration of the loan.”
Also on the chopping block, McAfee Enterprise completed a debt exchange and announced a proposal to issue new first-out, second-out and third-out term loans in a multistep process, per S&P.
Its current first- and second-lien debtholders will have to take a discount and lose priority to the new super priority debt in order to participate in the new term loans. The discount percentage and priority mix changes depending on which step the investor participated in, resulting in different recoveries for different groups of existing investors. S&P subsequently lowered the issuer to SD, and the issue-level rating on its original first-lien and second-lien term loans to D, from CCC+.
Also receiving a downgrade to SD, relocation and moving services provider Sirva Inc. has completed a debt exchange with the holders of its first- and second-lien debt. Given the discount to par and below-market compensation (including some pay-in-kind [PIK] components), S&P views the transaction as tantamount to a default because the debtholders received less value than they were originally promised under the debt obligations, prompting a downgrade of its affected loans to D.
Finally, United Site Services Inc, a Massachusetts-based national provider of portable sanitation and related services and products, executed a restructuring transaction that, among other things, swapped $1.744 billion, or 90% of the its first-lien term loan, for $1.657 billion of second-out loans due December 2028, implying a discount of around 5%, with the company’s option to extend the maturity to April 2030 for a 50 bps increase in pricing and a one-time fee, per S&P. Meanwhile, the nonparticipating lenders and noteholders now have weaker credit protections and reduced claims on collateral.
“Given the weaker recovery standing of the nonparticipating group following the initial transaction, we expect them to also exchange their debt at the offered material discount to par,” lead analyst Daniel Krauss wrote in the Aug. 28 report downgrading the company and the issuer debt to D.
“We view these transactions as coercive or distressed exchanges and tantamount to general default given this is restructuring a majority of the company’s debt and lenders will receive less value than they were originally promised under the securities. Specifically, the exchanges on the term loan and notes are at discounts to par and we do not believe the compensations offered for maturity extensions — given the company’s persistent negative free cash flows, deteriorating liquidity profile and unsustainable leverage — are adequate,” the report said.
Rinse and repeat
When all is said and done, LCD’s data show that a significant portion of issuers conducting these liability management exercises will return with a conventional, or hard, default.
During the pandemic default wave of 2020, for example, 27% of issuers returned with a conventional default of missed interest payments or a bankruptcy filing within the next three years.
More recently, troubled companies conducting distressed exchanges are still confronting higher interest rate burdens on their floating-rate debt, and more expensive credit conditions in refinancing or extending obligations.
In 2022, despite the shorter timeline, the share of companies returning with a payment default or bankruptcy jumped to 33%, while nearly 10% of LMEs from as recently as 2023 have already returned with a hard default of a payment miss or bankruptcy filing.
When excluding LMEs, breaking down sponsored versus non-sponsored companies shows that the rate of hard defaults of payment misses and bankruptcy filings among sponsored companies topped that of non-sponsored companies in March, April, May and June. In July and August, non-sponsored companies outpaced in terms of bankruptcy defaults and payment misses in the trailing twelve-month calculation.
Past trends show that during elevated periods of payment and bankruptcy defaults, such as the 2016 uptick in defaults driven by increased oil prices and the 2020 pandemic, sponsored companies typically defaulted at a much lower rate.
Highlighting the preference of sponsor companies for LMEs, which typically are more likely to preserve the equity stake held by private equity firms, sponsored companies in 2023 drove 90% of distressed exchanges.
In the LTM period, 82% of LMEs were sponsor driven.
Looking ahead, forward indicators of potential restructuring activity moved more favorably in August.
The distress ratio — which, as the below chart demonstrates, is a forerunner to default activity — eased to 3.82% in August, the first time this metric has dipped below 4% since April.
This metric, defined as the share of loans below the 80-price distress marker, remains above the 2024 low of 3.35% in February, but sits well below the high of 7.36% in December 2022, ahead of an interest rate-driven uptick in defaults in 2023.
By issuer count, the distress ratio fell to 5.48% in August, from 5.83% in July, and compares to a 2024 low of 4.95% in March.
Finally, ratings agency activity among loan issuers skewed more positively in August, with the pace of downgrades exceeding upgrades easing to a ratio of 1.94x on a rolling three-month basis, from 2.23x in July.
This compares to a 2024 low of 1.64x in March, and a recent high of 3.32x in February 2023.
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