European CLO managers are becoming increasingly active participants in restructurings — providing new money to distressed borrowers, joining creditor co-operation agreements, and in some cases litigating to protect their positions. As CLOs have grown into the dominant investor base in leveraged loans, simply selling troubled credits is no longer always an option.
Key points:
- Larger CLO market share and few natural buyers of stressed loans are making exits harder, pushing managers towards active roles in restructurings.
- Documentation provides a broad toolkit, but managers have used it sparingly and it is chiefly a means of protecting recoveries, though super-senior new money has traded above par.
- Co-operation agreements increase CLO influence over restructuring terms, while equity and PIK instruments received in restructurings remain a structural headache.
- Documentation has reached an equilibrium, with negotiation now focused on refinements such as the cap on uptier priming debt.
Recent CLO trading activity shows that CLO managers have managed to monetize super-priority priming debt at above par. This was the case for Invesco Euro CLO IX, which sold Colisee’s super-senior new money facility in September at 107.625 as a “credit improved” obligation. Permira’s Providus CLO II sold the same asset at 108.25 in June.
This summer, 12 Aurium CLO vehicles managed by Spire Partners (now part of Macquarie Asset Management) and members of an ad hoc group of noteholders filed a motion in New York to dismiss the Chapter 15 proceedings opened by Spain’s Grupo Antolin Irausa.
Active role
CLOs’ growing share of the European leveraged loan market has forced managers to adapt to a more aggressive restructuring environment. Rather than simply selling troubled credits, they are now increasingly called upon to negotiate restructurings, provide new money and defend their positions against liability management exercises (LMEs).
Against this backdrop, one market trend is playing in their favour — namely greater creditor coordination. “CLOs are part of a macro trend in the restructuring market: the formation of co-operation agreements. By participating in creditor groups, CLOs can seek to drive the terms of a restructuring with a view to receiving instruments that meet their objectives,” says Tim Lees, restructuring and insolvency partner at Clifford Chance.
Creditor co-op agreements can be controversial. Yet they can also be a lifeline for investors in complex restructurings, as seen in Altice France’s debt overhaul. This means that CLOs, rather than merely signing off on a restructuring proposed by others, can coordinate with lead creditors or even help drive processes themselves. Doing so, however, depends on moving swiftly.
“With LME risk increasing in Europe, managers have to organise early and proactively offer sustainable, fully-funded solutions to stressed issuers,” says Marc Touboul, partner and portfolio manager for Bain Capital Liquid and Structured Credit strategies.
Trading out
That all said, most managers’ first instinct is to sell. Generally, managers want to exit a credit before it deteriorates, observes Matthias Neugebauer, global co-head of structured credit at Fitch Ratings. “Nobody wants to hold the weaker names, and CLO managers are more focused than ever on reducing exposure to them,” he notes.
However, there is a cliff-edge effect in play here because there are relatively few natural buyers of stressed assets once a credit starts to weaken. “The challenge is that the CLO market’s share of the leveraged loan market has become so large that it is not always easy to exit at short notice, especially for larger managers who hold positions across several transactions,” Neugebauer adds. In these cases, making use of the CLOs’ restructuring toolkit can make sense.
In a report released in October, Barclays analysts estimated that CLOs hold 75-77% of European leveraged loans. In a February report, Barings put the share as high as 82%, compared with 67% in the US.
Knowing how CLO managers approach these tools matters to CLO investors. “At our S&P conference in Tokyo earlier this year, one of the areas of interest among investors was how CLO managers approach distressed assets, particularly in the context of liability management exercises and corporate restructurings. Is hands-on restructuring a ‘lost art’? was the classic question we delved into,” says Sandeep Chana, managing director, structured credit at S&P Global Ratings.
How managers respond depends partly on their restructuring experience and resources, Chana adds. “There is also an opportunity cost to consider, as participating in a restructuring can involve additional time, resources and expenses, while selling an asset may allow proceeds to be reinvested in other opportunities.”
Building the toolkit
CLO managers have many tools to manage stressed and defaulted assets, depending on their specific circumstances (for example, if these assets still pay interest or not). Their use must comply with strict criteria to ensure the overall portfolio continues to pass key profile tests, collateral quality tests and coverage tests — all reported monthly in trustee reports and monitored by rating agencies.
Taken together, these provisions give managers multiple ways to participate in restructurings, while limiting the impact on portfolio tests and noteholder protections.
Sustainable portion
One technique regularly used in European restructurings is to keep the sustainable portion of the debt as a performing loan at the operating company, which can remain at par in CLO coverage tests, and push the excess into a HoldCo PIK instrument. The PIK piece is typically subject to a cap and haircut, but as the smaller slice, its impact on par is limited. This technique has been used for borrowers such as Flint Group, Keter Group, HSE Finance and IGM Resin.
While many restructuring concepts already existed in European CLO documentation, the toolkit has expanded significantly in recent years — notably through the introduction of Loss Mitigation Obligations (LMOs) in 2020, and uptier priming debt provisions in 2022.
“The introduction of LMOs has been a game-changer. It gave CLO managers a fair degree of optionality to inject new cash into restructurings. This was a big shift,” says James Baillie, partner in the Structured Credit practice at Paul Hastings.
The LMO bucket is used by a few managers, but this is not necessarily the most widely used tool.
Blake Jones, partner in Clifford Chance’s Global Financial Markets team, specialising in CLOs, believes that CLO documentation is flexible enough that managers do not have to rely solely on LMOs. “CLO managers can use different concepts and different buckets; therefore, it may be better for managers to preserve LMO bucket capacity for future situations and instead rely on other restructuring provisions, such as distressed exchanges or bankruptcy exchanges,” he explains.
According to Daniel Kakonge, research director at CLO documentation analysis firm ReviewPort, uptier priming debt capacity is currently one of the most heavily negotiated provisions. “Some managers want it combined with current pay obligations and corporate rescue loans in a shared bucket, or in some cases given a separate ‘additional’ allowance on top of those limits,” he notes. “Some investors, by contrast, want a clear, strict standalone cap in the portfolio profile tests.”
Equity headache
One consequence of greater involvement in restructurings is that CLOs increasingly receive instruments that look very different from traditional senior secured loans. For example, many hold common shares and warrants of Colisee and Multi-Color Corp, as well as the equity of Casino, Altice France Holdings and Flint Group.
Equity securities are arguably the least suitable assets that CLO managers receive from restructurings, since they can be penalised with a 100% over-collateralisation haircut.
Rating agencies are particularly cautious on equity holdings. Depending on the terms of the CLO documentation, equity-related instruments, including warrants, will likely receive no credit in CLO tests and coverage calculations — reflecting the uncertainty associated with their valuation and eventual realisation, says Chana at S&P Global. Any proceeds they later generate could provide an additional source of recovery, he adds, though the timing and extent of any benefit remain uncertain.
Fitch’s Neugebauer notes that CLO managers always seek greater flexibility, and like the optionality provided by instruments such as equity. However, he warns that the “risk is that they end up throwing good money after bad rather than using the funds to deleverage or invest in a performing credit.”
Some market participants also question whether greater involvement in restructurings risks pulling CLO managers beyond their traditional role as creditors. “The question is whether managers are adopting a shareholder perspective rather than a creditor view,” notes a CLO manager. “For example, is there a conflict? How do voting rights work? Are they equipped to do this?”
What works?
As a distressed debt specialist observed, most lenders do not want the keys to businesses.
“Although they can hold other types of instrument, CLOs typically favour solutions that preserve their debt exposure,” says Tim Lees at Clifford Chance.
But holding equity can make sense, or even prove preferable to instruments that appear to be more suitable on paper. “Holding equity in a CLO portfolio is punitive, but, in many cases, equity will trade better than an illiquid out-of-the-money subordinated PIK security,” says Bain’s Touboul, pointing to the cases of Numericable and Colisee.
Touboul expects to see more situations in Europe where holding equity provides at least some upside, and helps better monetise asset recoveries.
However, the jury is still out for many other securities. “We have found that CLO managers have so far been cautious in using these instruments, possibly because uptiers and dropdowns have remained relatively rare in Europe,” says Neugebauer. “It is hard to tell whether these instruments have helped improve recoveries because the sample size is too small.”
Broad adoption
Market participants may disagree on the best use of the toolkit, but its overall architecture is no longer in question, and the reservations that initially accompanied the introduction of LMOs have largely faded.
“CLO managers follow different strategies and collateral management is not a one-size-fits-all approach, but the language around the main tools is now widely adopted. When drafting the documentation for new transactions, discussions focus on refining specific provisions rather than the concepts themselves,” says Clifford Chance’s Jones.
James Baillie at Paul Hastings echoes that view: “I think we have reached a satisfactory equilibrium. CLO managers always want more flexibility, but there are no obvious deficiencies that need fixing, and they are not pushing for anything new. Their focus recently is more on tweaks around the edges.”
S&P Global’s Chana adds that a broader range of instruments and recovery mechanisms may emerge within CLO portfolios as restructuring activity continues to evolve. “These developments could provide managers with additional avenues to preserve or recover value in distressed situations, although the ultimate benefit will depend on the performance of the underlying assets and the effectiveness of the restructuring process,” he notes.
Whether these tools ultimately improve recoveries remains difficult to assess. But as CLOs account for an ever-larger share of the leveraged loan market, managers are likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping restructuring outcomes rather than simply trading around them.
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