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CLOs

Captive equity boom rewrites rules for Europe’s CLO and leveraged loan markets

Captive CLO equity funds are generating interest in the leveraged finance space.

Captive CLO equity funds are generating plenty of interest in leveraged finance as these vehicles reshape both the loan and CLO markets.

According to market sources and participants in a special PitchBook LCD News survey in May, these funds — which are raised by CLO managers to invest in the equity tranches of their new CLOs — are a force to be reckoned with, raising important questions about market discipline, alignment of interests, and governance standards.

Making the case for captive funds is relatively straightforward. These vehicles are widely viewed as useful in stressed periods, allowing CLO managers to capitalize on market dislocations when third-party investors retreat. Captive funds also provide a new route into the asset class for investors.

However, their growing presence alters market dynamics.

“The CLO market is shifting as captive equity funds have introduced a new dynamic,” Florian Viros, a fund manager in Carmignac’s Credit team, told LCD News. Historically, the market had a self-correcting mechanism, he explains: “When the CLO arbitrage stopped working, deal formation slowed, allowing loan prices and CLO spreads to adjust in order to improve the economics for the CLO equity. Due to the dominance of captive equity vehicles, this historical feature of the CLO market has largely disappeared.”

Mixed bag
Respondents to LCD’s survey see mixed effects from captive CLO equity in the leveraged loan and CLO markets.

More than one-third of respondents believe that captive equity funds undermine the market’s self-correcting arbitrage mechanism and have weakened market discipline. However, a plurality of respondents said that the impact of the funds is mixed.

Bifurcating market
CIFC Asset Management pointed to a “move of historical magnitude in the CLO arbitrage” in 2025, when loan spreads in the US tightened much more than CLO spreads. Demand from captive CLO equity vehicles “appears to have allowed deals to price even as the arbitrage narrowed, with asset spread compression outpacing liability relief,” CIFC writes in a report titled “Misread, Not Impaired: Why CLO Equity Deserves a Second Look.”

Supported by captive funds, sustained CLO formation may have also played a role in bifurcating the leveraged loan market, as loan purchases persisted during periods of volatility, concentrating on stronger credits.

BofA Global Research highlighted an “unusual” degree of bifurcation in the softer European loan market of mid-April, where 64% of the market was still trading above 98. In fact, the loan market has been bifurcating since August 2025, according to BofA strategists, who think that captive funds are part of the explanation. “In our view, the main culprits are sporadic new money loan supply and strong CLO creation, hence creating a technical backdrop where good quality loans do not reprice properly even as the macro backdrop sours,” they wrote in their “European CLO Weekly,” dated April 20.

Regarding CLO creation specifically, “we think the proliferation of captive equity funds is one of the drivers, with some CLO managers able to lock in equity funding for multiple deals and thus can keep printing deals even when the arbitrage is poor,” BofA strategists said.

Return targets
What returns are captive equity investors actually getting? Holders of subordinated notes have essentially two ways of achieving their return targets. One is through the CLO arbitrage — i.e., pocketing much of the difference between the loan spread and the coupon that must be paid to CLO investors — the interest-only (IO) component. The second is through capital appreciation — the principal-only (PO) component.

In Europe, holders of the equity tranche may also reset the transaction, generally after a year and a half, thereby potentially improving the liability cost. Even when there is little or no excess spread, investors can find subordinated notes an attractive proposition through the “optionality.” They are “buying the optionality.”

Lately, some market participants have openly expressed skepticism over the actual and future returns, especially in a bifurcated market where many loans already trade at or above par. As CIFC noted, “while market-implied equity returns frequently dipped into the single digits, issuance remained resilient because these vehicles provided a stable source of capital,” adding: “We believe the reality of these potentially sub-optimal returns is finally catching up to these captive vehicles.”

Shiloh Bates, CIO of US alternative investment firm Flat Rock Global, noted in a recent “Insights” post that some US CLOs issued in 2025 “featured projected equity returns that were materially lower than those available through comparable secondary-market investments.”

Third-party investors are wary of new issues relying solely or mostly on the PO component. “The day-one IO and PO are important considerations for us. We value the optionality to increase the IO, but a transaction also needs to generate some excess spread,” says Inès Bartsch, chief executive officer at CIS Asset Management, a Germany-based CLO investor.

Respondents acknowledged a legitimate counter-argument. One participant noted that captive equity funds have return targets of their own, meaning issuance does not get done at any level of arbitrage.

But one key concern among third-party CLO equity investors is that some CLO managers may be more inclined to structure transactions with little excess spread — that is, with the potential rewards much further down the line, because they have the short-term benefit of increasing their AUM.

Alignment of interest
There are often conflicting interests between growing AUM, by forcing CLO issuance, and ensuring that the CLO equity tranches achieve an adequate internal rate of return (IRR), Carmignac’s Viros said. The survey shed some light on this. In fact, the survey’s sharpest result concerns precisely the alignment of interests. Over half of respondents said the captive format creates weaker alignment, with the manager’s incentive to issue and grow AUM potentially taking precedence over equity returns. About one quarter felt the alignment is a function of fund terms and fee structure rather than the captive format itself.

On governance, views were more dispersed. Over one-third of respondents said governance quality varies too significantly across managers and structures to generalize. Roughly a quarter flagged meaningful governance challenges arising from the concentration of deal selection, portfolio construction and reinvestment decisions in a single entity. One respondent observed that the picture is complex, as managers must also weigh performance considerations alongside AUM maintenance — suggesting the conflict is not binary.

In practice, third-party CLO equity investors do not necessarily shun transactions issued by CLO managers with their own captive equity fund — some may particularly like one manager, or seek some manager diversification. But they are particularly cautious when a captive fund is involved.

Divya Vamadevan, managing director at CIS Asset Management, explains: “We can work with CLO managers who have their own captive fund that is used to support the risk retention, as long as the manager is disciplined and maintains equity-friendly documentation language. But we do not prefer CLO platforms with focus on AUM generation.”

The reset versus liquidation question is one scenario where misalignment can become more conspicuous.

Vamadevan notes that “in some cases, third-party equity investors will favor a liquidation, pocket the gains and reinvest in a new transaction, but the CLO manager with a captive equity fund may choose to reset the transaction and maintain their AUM.”

Respondents to the PitchBook LCD News survey also saw a risk of complacency in benign conditions, when the discipline normally imposed by external equity investors is absent.

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Sizing up
The CLO equity market is small but pivotal, and all the more so when leverage is factored in. BofA Global Research estimated the size of the European CLO equity market at around €29 billion in its April 13 European CLO primer. Probably more than half of it is unavailable to third-party investors, the strategists estimate.

Part of these subordinated notes is required for the CLO manager to comply with the European Union’s risk retention rules — when the manager opts for the horizontal retention route, often 50% to 70% of the equity is retained, according to BofA. Some CLO managers also choose to retain at least 51% of equity and some retain all equity, BofA adds.

The captive funds’ US market share tends to be around 70%. This is the percentage mentioned by CIFC for 2025 new issues.

Eagle Point estimated that probably more than 75% of all CLOs created in the second half of 2025 were taken by captive funds, and “that’s distorting to the market,” said CEO Thomas Majewski during Eagle Point Credit Company’s Q4 2025 earnings conference call in February.

These funds can be very large. On April 23, CVC Credit announced the final close of CVC CLO Equity IV with $1 billion of commitments. Across its period of deployment, this equity fund is intended to support approximately $15 billion of global CLO issuance for CVC Credit’s Liquid Credit platform, focusing on equity investments in CVC-managed CLOs issued in the US and Europe. In aggregate, CVC Credit has now raised approximately $2.7 billion of capital across its four CLO equity funds.

Bain Capital, meanwhile, announced on April 9 that its latest captive fund, Bain Capital Credit CLO Management III, had achieved $1.5 billion in total commitments, including around $1.2 billion of external commitments from a “diverse group of new and existing limited partners globally, including corporate pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices and high-net-worth individuals, endowments and foundations, and insurance companies.” Bain Capital employees and alumni committed the balance of the fund. The press release mentions a “well-established strategy of delivering equity-like returns.”

Broadening base
The rough breakdown of the external commitments provided by Bain and the open-ended responses to LCD News’ survey show that the rapid growth of captive CLO equity funds is not solely driven by the CLO managers’ desire to grow AUM and secure a captive issuance base.

Alternatives and private credit investors that would not typically access CLO equity directly may find captive funds an interesting proposition. In their CLO weekly dated May 15, BofA US strategists note that wealth managers and pensions “prefer captive funds due to limited analytical capacity when exploring equity options.”

Participants noted that the rise of captive equity is part of a broader reconfiguration of CLO equity access — with investors choosing between direct investments, third-party CLO funds and captive vehicles depending on their return and structural preferences.

The implication for the market is that the investor base for CLO equity is widening, but the terms on which that capital enters the market may carry structural trade-offs that are not yet fully priced into how participants think about cycle risk and manager incentives.

However, determining who may get the short end of the stick is not always straightforward. Flat Rock’s Bates commented that the word “captive” means that something or someone is taken prisoner. “In the case of captive equity funds, it’s not clear if the prisoner is the fund’s investors or the entire CLO market,” he remarked.

Featured image by sukanya sitthikongsak/Getty Images

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