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Private Credit

Europe’s banks deploy SRT scalpel across private credit exposures

Synthetic risk transfers are being used across a range of transactions.

European banks are increasingly deploying synthetic risk transfer (SRT) transactions to manage private credit exposures, using bespoke transactions to free up capital, reduce concentrations and support continued lending.

Key findings:

  • Banks in Europe are using SRTs to manage private credit exposures across infrastructure debt, subscription lines and NAV facilities.
  • Exposures to private credit and private equity funds — particularly fund-finance structures — are viewed by investors as high quality, and trade at tight spreads.
  • Capital relief remains the primary driver as private credit loans attract high risk weights, creating strong SRT incentives.
  • Heightened regulatory scrutiny around financing provided to SRT investors and concerns over back leverage have prompted some banks to reduce the availability of repo funding.

“Banks have been active in the direct lending space in the past few years, sometimes with the intention to write large tickets that can push them above their internal borrower limits,” says Alan Shaffran, senior portfolio manager and partner at Magnetar. “This creates an incentive to find partners to share that risk.”

Monsur Hussain, head of markets research at Fitch Ratings, notes that European banks are facing “increasingly pointed regulatory scrutiny over their private credit exposures,” while internal risk teams are looking to actively manage these positions, adding that in this context, SRT transactions “can be likened to a scalpel, allowing banks to target exposures with precision — whether at the level of individual obligors, sectors or geographies.”

Broad scope
Private-credit SRTs span a broad range of assets — from infrastructure loans financing renewable energy projects, data centres and project finance, to shipping loans — while subscription lines and NAV lending remain among the market’s largest segments.

“What we are seeing are SRT-like transactions aimed at optimising bank balance sheets, where direct-lending-type loans or club-deal loans increasingly sit alongside broadly-syndicated leveraged loans,” Shaffran notes.

Investors note that the scope of private-credit-related SRTs goes well beyond direct lending portfolios.

The SRT market has been used to distribute both direct private-credit exposures — such as highly leveraged loans backing LBOs — and exposure to private credit and private equity funds or investment structures such as BDCs, says Matthew Moniot, co-head of credit risk sharing at Man Group. In contrast to high leverage LBO loans, fund-level exposures are considered to be of a very high quality, and as a result they trade at extremely tight spreads, Moniot notes.

Behind the curtain
The SRT market is fiercely private and relationship-driven, but details of a handful of transactions offer a glimpse into how banks are deploying SRTs.

One such deal was completed by BNP Paribas in December last year, with the French lender issuing its first synthetic securitisation referencing RCF exposures to US Business Development Companies (BDCs). This transaction — thought to be the first such deal executed by a European bank — referenced a portfolio of $1.25 billion and is understood to have been placed with Golub.

At the outer edge of the SRT framework, law firm A&O Shearman in June publicised its advisory role in two credit risk transfer transactions referencing single loans with an aggregate notional amount of roughly €630 million in the digital infrastructure sector.

Meanwhile, BBVA was in late June expected to close an SRT transaction that would reduce its risk exposure to AI infrastructure loans.

Sources consulted by LCD News said it is difficult to determine whether SRT activity linked to private credit is growing faster than the broader SRT market, given the rapid expansion of risk-transfer transactions across an increasingly diverse range of asset classes. What appears more likely — at least for now — is that banks are using SRTs to remain within internal risk limits and concentration thresholds set by their risk management teams.

According to Alan McNamara, managing director in Howden CAP’s Balance Sheet Advisory & Structuring business, banks are seeking to free up capacity on financing lines provided to sponsors or funds (notably through asset-based lending), either because they are approaching internal borrower concentration limits, or because they want to de-risk parts of their portfolios to continue lending and expand relationships with their clients.

Frank Benhamou, risk transfer portfolio manager at Cheyne Capital, points to the growing number of “opportunistic transactions.” In his view, SRTs referencing private credit portfolios are likely to become increasingly prevalent as the market continues to expand across a broader range of asset classes.

Data bank
The scale of the market’s expansion is reflected in data from the International Association of Credit Portfolio Managers (IACPM). This shows that in 2025, participating banks securitized €378 billion of loans and protected €30 billion of junior tranches — representing increases of 35% and 21% respectively compared to 2024, according to the IACPM’s annual SRT survey published in June 2026.

Critical node
In its May 2026 Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) described banks as a “critical node within the private credit ecosystem,” noting that they provide multiple types of financing to private credit funds, corporate borrowers and investors such as insurers and pension funds.

Subscription lines are the most common form of bank financing to private credit funds, according to the report. Through SRTs on subscription line facilities, banks can transfer to investors a defined tranche of the credit risk that fund borrowers — typically private funds backed by committed investor capital — fail to repay drawn amounts.

“Although they can be trickier to securitise, we view subscription financing lines as low risk because these facilities are typically secured by Limited Partners’ high credit-quality commitments, rated well into the investment grade category,” says Fitch’s Monsur Hussain.

Frank Benhamou reckons that there have been a handful of SRT transactions on subscription lines this year. “Historically, this asset class has performed exceptionally well, with no recorded losses to date, which is why it is generally viewed as carrying very low credit risk,” he explains. However, the absence of historical losses does not mean losses are impossible, he adds.

Meanwhile, NAV financing lines can be good candidates for SRTs, but are rated slightly lower, with a single-A+ cap, Hussain notes.

These types of SRTs are generally driven more by risk management considerations than by capital optimisation alone, as achieving capital relief may require banks to develop and maintain correlation models, which is not always straightforward, Benhamou notes.

Deepening connections
That centrality, however, raises a question that regulators have been increasingly willing to ask: if banks finance the ecosystem at multiple points, how clean is the risk transfer that SRTs are designed to achieve?

One of the key messages of the FSB’s report was that the interconnections between private credit funds and banks, insurers, and private equity firms are deepening, with the potential to heighten vulnerabilities.

There is a question regarding the extent to which banks are investing in private credit funds or other Non‑Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) that, in turn, invest in banks’ SRTs, the report stated. Banks may provide funding to these entities, such as loans or repos, which could increase their leverage. This could create “circles of risks,” whereby a private credit fund’s SRT investment ultimately becomes a risk for the bank providing the funding, the FSB report warned.

A March 2026 Working Paper from the ECB titled “Synthetic, but how much risk transfer?” also pointed to the interconnectedness of banks and non-bank investors, estimating that banks are 57–66% more likely to sell SRTs to non-bank investors to which they also grant credit during the sample period, compared to SRT investors with no such connection.

The ECB paper found that as much as 26% of SRT funding may ultimately be sourced from bank credit. Total investor leverage was, however, viewed as “modest,” with an average bank-debt-to-assets ratio of around 7%, “likely limiting round-tripping risks.”

According to practitioners, the key channel for this interconnectedness is repo funding, a form of secured borrowing whereby an investor pledges assets to a bank in exchange for cash, agreeing to repurchase those assets at a later date — often to finance or leverage an investment position. This is a recurring topic at SRT conference panels, where experts typically argue that the basic maths shows repo funding of SRT investors cannot create systemic risk, given the small size of the tranches involved.

Repo financing exists primarily as a liquidity-management tool, much like an asset-backed revolving credit facility for corporates, says Moniot at Man Group, who stresses that the amount of outstanding repo financing remains a small fraction of the overall market.

The market misconception that probably irritates SRT professionals most is that some banks could be providing funding to SRT investors who invest in the SRTs they originate. Several sources consulted by LCD insisted that same-bank ‘round-tripping’ is simply not occurring in the market.

The ECB paper drew a sharp response from Paris Europlace, the Paris financial industry’s main advocacy and promotion platform, which described the section about interconnectedness with non-bank entities as “extremely confusing.” Paris Europlace argued that there “may be a patently obvious reason for this likelihood: The banks already have an existing business relationship with these investors and are therefore more likely to conduct business with them.”

Yet doubts persist over whether the risk has truly exited the banking system — a debate that SRT professionals regard as rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of how the instrument works.

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Credit risk
The core of their argument is structural. In its response to the ECB paper, Paris Europlace argues that SRT investors gain direct exposure to the underlying loan portfolio, rather than additional exposure to the originating bank.

Cheyne Capital’s Benhamou agrees: “Credit risk ultimately sits with the investor, who absorbs any losses on the underlying portfolio. While there is some counterparty risk between the investor and the bank providing the repo facility, this is heavily mitigated through substantial haircuts, the investor’s credit quality and daily margining.”

Howden’s McNamara echoes that view. “The debate overlooks the structural seniority of banks providing funding. The risk assumed by these lenders is fundamentally different from that borne by SRT investors,” he points out.

“Whatever one’s view on the merits of bank financing in this context, it is important to distinguish risk allocation: LPs take the first-loss hit, while financing banks remain structurally senior and insulated from that initial loss layer,” adds McNamara.

According to Moniot, the question should be: “are managers appropriately managing asset-liability risk and have they analyzed the risk to debt capital impairment under both credit loss and market-value loss scenarios? When these conditions are met, risks to the banking system are de minimis.”

Concerns raised by regulators over so-called back leverage have already had an impact, tightening both the availability and pricing of repo funding.

“At the moment, fewer banks are willing to provide repo funding and some that do have narrowed the scope of what they are prepared to fund,” explains Magnetar’s Shaffran. Crucially, some banks now apply more expensive capital treatment to these lines, passing on the cost to SRT investors.

However, investors retain access to alternative funding sources — including NAV facilities — and market participants note that SRTs as a capital relief tool continue to enjoy broad regulatory support.

Disclosure rules
Confidentiality rules may prove as limiting to the growth of the SRT market as concerns among regulators. In practice, banks operate under strict constraints when it comes to borrower-level disclosure, even with NDAs in place. These limitations are even more acute in fund finance, where revealing the identity of underlying obligors is particularly sensitive, notes McNamara.

The main impediment to higher transaction volumes is the challenge of building portfolios that are sufficiently large and diversified to support an SRT transaction, while also having the operational infrastructure required to manage these structures effectively, Benhamou says.

“Investors understand that banks cannot disclose everything, but they still require enough information to perform robust credit analysis and assess the risks they are being asked to take,” he adds.

That said, investor appetite for fund-finance-related risk is there. “There seems to be nearly no impediment to the distribution of fund finance exposures,” says Man Group’s Moniot. “Assets referencing fund vehicles trade at extremely thin spreads, suggesting the market is eager to back these exposures, despite essentially no transparency into the underlying exposure.”

Confidentiality constraints may be a source of frustration for investors, but they are unlikely to derail the market’s growth. With private credit continuing to expand and banks seeking capital-efficient ways to manage concentrations, market participants expect private-credit-related SRT issuance to remain on an upward trajectory.

Featured image by Michael Blann/Getty Images.

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