The Chapter 11 bankruptcy of aftermarket auto parts maker First Brands has prompted scrutiny of potential mischief in credit markets and ignited a blame game among lenders. It has also thrown nomenclature about credit into sharp relief at a sensitive moment for lenders trying to market private credit as a sensible part of a diversified investment portfolio.
Asset managers are in a race to bring private investments to retail investors, targeting defined contribution plans and 401(k)s. Changes appear to be imminent: In August, President Trump signed an executive order calling for a reexamination of guidance on alternative assets in 401(k) and other defined contribution plans.
Nearly half of market participants projected “moderate growth” of retail capital in private credit over the next few years, with another 30% of market participants seeing retail investors as a “major new capital source,” according to an LCD poll conducted on Oct. 15.
But the push will ultimately require buy-in from retail investors themselves, who must opt to allocate capital to an asset class previously referred to as “shadow banking” and regularly described as “opaque.” The September bankruptcy by First Brands led to multiple press reports that linked the Chapter 11 to private credit, potentially complicating this effort.
“These really weren’t private credit stories,” Blue Owl Capital co-president Craig Packer told CNBC on Oct. 15, referring to the collapses of First Brands and the subprime auto lender Tricolor. “They were mostly an issue in the public markets. We didn’t have any exposure to those two names, and most of our large peers didn’t either.”
“I think it’s an example of an overreaction,” said Packer.
As the private credit market attempts to bring in a wider investor base, it turns out it’s very important to get names right.
A spade is a spade
PitchBook LCD defines private credit as directly originated loans to corporate borrowers that are not broadly syndicated. They are typically unrated, and borrowers range from the smallest companies to those generating as much as $100 million in EBITDA. The most popular strategy in recent years in private credit is lending to companies backed by PE firms, particularly in what is considered the “core” middle market, around $50 million in EBITDA.
A single lender or small group, known as a “club” of lenders, can provide the financing, potentially numbering more than 20 for the largest deals.
Unitranche loans are the bread and butter of the market, but private credit lenders can invest in second-lien loans, revolving credit lines, and delayed-draw term loans (DDTLs).
Private credit is regularly used synonymously with “direct lending” in this sense.
Private credit is also used as an umbrella term to indicate any financing provided by a non-bank lender, which can encompass other strategies such as lending to real estate, infrastructure, distressed and stressed companies, and venture debt. Specialty finance strategies and asset-based lending (ABL) are often lumped into this category.
With loose definitions and overlapping categories of debt, it’s no surprise that observers are muddling private credit and First Brands’ Chapter 11.
The bulk of First Brands’ term loan debt was originated in the broadly syndicated loan market. First Brands was the 42nd largest borrower out of roughly 1,100 in the Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan Index, and its debt is widely held in US CLO portfolios.
In bankruptcy filings, the company reported $6.1 billion of on-balance sheet debt, including roughly $5.3 billion of dollar- and euro-denominated term loans agented by broadly syndicated lenders.
First Brands syndicated loans appear in BDC portfolios. BDCs (business development companies) are often associated with private credit loans, and offer a lens into the loans’ structures and spreads that are otherwise not widely publicized.
First Brands is also a direct lending borrower. Affiliates of Sagard agented a $250 million credit facility for First Brands in June, the filings show. Strategic Value Partners was the largest lender on the deal, according to a Bloomberg report.
However, much of the “private credit” exposure to the troubled auto parts manufacturer comes not from traditional direct lending, but from the more esoteric and specialized world of supply chain financing.
The X factor
First Brands’ list of its largest unsecured creditors shows HFS is owed about $234 million, Trade Finance Company is owed about $208 million, 1977 O’Connor is owed about $116 million, and CIT is owed about $84 million, with the type of claim listed as “supply chain finance.”
HFS is UBS Hedge Fund Solutions; 1977 O’Connor is an affiliate of UBS O’Connor, a hedge fund. UBS disclosed roughly $500 million in exposure to First Brands across multiple funds. CIT Group is a division of First Citizens Bank.
Beyond its $6.1 billion of on-balance sheet debt, First Brands’ liabilities included $2.3 billion in off-balance sheet debt through special purpose vehicles.
The company’s off-balance sheet debt includes $77.8 million in asset-backed revolving credit facilities agented by Aequum Capital and UMB Bank (UMB is admin only, not a lender); $159 million in financing provided by AB CarVal; and $230 million in facilities provided by Evolution Credit Opportunity Master Fund; each earmarked for inventory financing purposes, bankruptcy filings show.
Aequum Capital is a specialty finance lender backed by Castlelake, providing asset-backed and cash flow debt facilities. AB CarVal is an affiliate of Alliance Bernstein. Evolution Credit Partners is a private lender offering supply chain and accounts receivable financing.
The balance of the off-balance sheet debt comprises a $1.9 billion equipment financing agreement led by Onset Financial, which was used by a special purpose vehicle to purchase inventory and equipment to lease to First Brands. Onset Financial is an independently owned equipment finance lender.
Additionally, First Brands disclosed $800 million in unsecured supply chain financing liabilities and estimated that it had accrued an unpaid balance of $2.3 billion on its third-party factoring liabilities.
Factoring, alongside its close cousin reverse-factoring, is a form of invoice financing in which companies borrow against their accounts receivable. Prominent among First Brands’ factoring lenders are affiliates of Jefferies.
Jefferies faces losses through its affiliated fund, Point Bonita Capital, an asset-based financier providing invoice lending. It is a division of Leucadia Asset Management. Jefferies disclosed on Oct. 8 that Point Bonita had $715 million invested in First Brands’ receivables.
For almost six years, Point Bonita said in a corporate statement, it had always been paid on time and in full, until Sept. 15 in the lead-up to First Brands’ bankruptcy. Since then, allegations have surfaced that First Brands had commingled collateral and factored receivables multiple times.
“The issues surrounding First Brands are the result of decisions and actions at First Brands, including possible fraudulent or otherwise improper activity that is under investigation by the First Brands’ Chief Restructuring Officer and reportedly under investigation by the United States Department of Justice,” Jefferies Financial Group CEO Rich Handler and president Brian Friedman wrote in a letter to investors.
“We learned of the fraud allegations when the rest of the public learned, and then only after First Brands ceased remitting to Point Bonita cash collected in respect of the accounts receivable owned by the fund,” they wrote.
First Brands announced on Oct. 13 that founder and CEO Patrick James had resigned.
Based in Cleveland, First Brands is a producer of automotive aftermarket products that include windscreen wiper blades, brake products, fuel and water pumps, spark plugs and glass treatments.
Featured image by Matt_scherf/Getty Images
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