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Distressed & Defaults

Judges put brake on costly new money in UK restructuring plans

Petrofac’s complex legal case gave London’s Court of Appeal the opportunity to fine-tune tests that judges use to make sure the restructuring plans submitted to them are fair.

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Key points:

  • The appeals judges in the Petrofac case found that returns on new money envisaged in the restructuring plan were disproportionate.
  • The court also determined that submissions of out-of-the-money creditors merited consideration.
  • Some restructuring practitioners question the practicality of market testing for new money.
  • Lawyers agree that more cases are needed to understand how judges will assess the fair allocation of restructuring benefits.

Providing new money to a struggling company carries inherent risk, but it can yield significant returns for lenders. That said, is the injection of new money post-restructuring truly that risky?

The appeals judges in the Petrofac case said that the returns envisaged in the restructuring plan (RP) looked disproportionate. In their view, outsized gains on new money constitute a “restructuring benefit,” and judges need to be confident this benefit is fairly allocated among creditors before approving a reorganization plan over the objections of dissenting parties.

According to Sonya Van de Graaff, a partner in K&L Gates’ finance practice in London, the Court of Appeal made it clear that the “cross-class cram down power is a mechanism to prevent a class of creditors from exercising an unjustified right of veto. Its purpose is not to enable assenting classes a right to appropriate to themselves an inequitable share of the benefits of the restructuring.”

The judgment also brings up some questions. Natalie Blanc, counsel in the business restructuring group of Ropes & Gray’s London office, notes that “with the court’s emphasis on a broad concept of fairness to the out-of-the-money creditors comes an increased risk that the effectiveness of the cross-class cramdown tool is undermined, because out-of-the-money creditors know that they have some latitude to challenge a proposal that they are not satisfied with, even if it has the support of the company and its in-the-money creditors and would otherwise be implementable.”

Petrofac’s complex legal case — handed down on July 1 — gave London’s Court of Appeal the opportunity to fine-tune some of the tests that first-instance judges use to make sure the restructuring plans submitted to them are fair.

Almost as important for restructuring practitioners as its stance on new money, the court determined that the submissions of Samsung and Saipem, as dissenting creditors in that case, merited some consideration. This departs from — or, at the very least substantially qualifies — the four-year old jurisprudence that the views of out-of-the-money creditors carry little or no weight.

Market shift
The recent legal proceedings involving Thames Water, centered on an interim restructuring plan, garnered significant media attention. The Petrofac case — concerning a fully fledged restructuring plan — appears to have sparked equal, if not greater, interest within the legal community, as evidenced by the number of client alerts and legal memoranda published in the weeks following the judgment.

“To Benefit or Not to Benefit: That is the Question for Plan Companies Post-Petrofac” was the headline of a King & Spalding client alert. In “Petrofac Restructuring Plans Overturned, but Significant Questions Left Unanswered,” Paul Weiss lawyers warn that the uncertainties created by this judgment may affect the perceived utility of the English restructuring plan for complex financial restructurings, particularly in comparison with US and certain European alternatives.

Sonya Van de Graaff, one of the authors of K&L’s “Back to the Drawing Board for Restructuring Plans — Part 26A of the UK Companies Act 2006” briefing, told LCD News that “if you compare [Petrofac to] where we started back in 2020, where out of the money creditors were given short shrift, Petrofac seems to be a dramatic change, but the truth is that this issue has seen a gradual evolution.”

“In the last five years, we have had the benefit of plan companies presenting very different factual circumstances, and the courts have made it clear that every case is very sensitive to the facts,” she adds.

Kon Asimacopoulos, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, also sees the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Petrofac “as part of a continued but expected judicial evolution and focus on the fair allocation of benefits preserved or generated by a restructuring.”

“However the rulings on permissible parameters for new money represent a more significant shift. It is clear that additional evidence as to the terms of new money — whether through expert evidence, market testing or otherwise — will be required going forward,” he notes.

Restructuring surplus
The introduction of restructuring plans (RPs) in June 2020 aimed to address the absence of a cross-class cram down mechanism in England’s existing restructuring regime, the scheme of arrangement. Through a cross-class cram down, a court can bind dissenting classes of creditors to a restructuring plan as long as they would be no worse off under the RP than they would be in the most likely outcome were the RP not to be agreed.

Petrofac was only the third case to reach the Court of Appeal. Its RP was challenged by Samsung and Saipem, which were joint venture partners, but also competitors.

This year, judges in England have had the opportunity to pay close attention to what is often termed “the restructuring surplus,” which is the value preserved or generated by the restructuring plan, and its allocation among all creditor classes — and how much should be paid to those out-of-the-money, and therefore likely dissenting creditors.

As the Petrofac appeals judges put it, “the proper use of the cross-class cram down power is to enable a plan to be sanctioned against the opposition of those unreasonably holding out for a better deal, where there has been a genuine attempt to formulate and negotiate a reasonable compromise between all stakeholders.”

But Petrofac’s judges expressed concern over the premise of the negotiations because, in their view, those talks “failed to address at all the appropriate allocation” of the return on the new money, as this return also constitutes a benefit preserved or generated by the restructuring.

According to lawyers at Macfarlanes, prior to the Court of Appeal’s decisions in the Thames Water and Petrofac cases, “it was possible to argue that the ‘in the money’ creditors were the sole owners of the benefits created by a restructuring plan and therefore able to allocate them as they saw fit. It is clear that such an argument is no longer sustainable.”

This creates a legal grey area, as there is no consensus on what a fairer allocation should look like in nonconsensual restructurings. “It is difficult to know what will be a fair proposal for out-of-the-money creditors — and any such proposal would at the same time need to be accepted by in-the-money creditors in order to be implementable through the restructuring plan process,” Ropes & Gray’s Blanc points out. “There is no bright-line test for it and people will be cautious when structuring new money until the parameters become more clear in further cases.”

A consequence of this could be an increased scope for dissenting creditor challenge following the Petrofac court decision, suggests Blanc. “There will likely be more of an impetus to reach an agreement with dissenting creditors prior to launching a restructuring plan, potentially giving out-of-the-money creditors more negotiating power and greater incentive to hold out,” she adds.

Cost of money
Petrofac’s restructuring plan featured some $350 million of new money, split between new equity and new-money notes, conditional on a successful restructuring — that is, the new money was provided to the post-RP company, and with a strengthened balance sheet.

The court also looked at the backstop fees and work fees, also in the form of equity once the RP was approved.

Providers of the new money were expected to be allocated 67.7% of the new equity in the restructured group, with an estimated value of roughly $1 billion.

The enterprise value of the restructured group on a going-concern basis was estimated by Teneo in April 2025 at between $1.40 billion and $1.75 billion. But when the restructuring was being discussed with the ad hoc group in late 2024, the post-restructuring equity value was estimated at $351 million.

The fact that Teneo, which had been commissioned by Petrofac, “has arrived at such a large valuation in this case is, at the very least, something which calls for an explanation, rooted in credible evidence, as to why the Plans should give what appears to be an immediate three-fold or even higher return on the New Money,” the appeals judges said.

If the terms are disproportionate relative to what can be obtained in the market, this becomes a “benefit, not a cost, of the restructuring, the allocation of which needs to be specifically justified,” the Court of Appeal said, regretting the lack of expert evidence as to market terms or evidence of market testing.

The judges also closed the door to what is a widely used mitigant: giving the option to all creditors to participate in the new money on the same terms. “There may be many and varied reasons why creditors are not prepared to make the further investment required in order to participate in that opportunity,” the judges said. “The fact that they do not wish to do so may well not be a reason for depriving them of a share in the benefits of the restructuring to which they would otherwise be entitled,” they added.

K&L Gates’ Sonya Van de Graaff notes that the court’s emphasis was on the need for evidence. “The Court of Appeal made clear that what constitutes a fair allocation of the benefits of the restructuring is not a ‘finger in the air’ exercise; the onus is on the plan company to convince the court that it is fair. This means they need to adduce evidence, and in the case of Petrofac, it came down to whether the cost of the new money was at market price. The plan company hadn’t gone to market to price the new money, and so the court said they had failed to satisfy the burden of proof in that regard.”

Testing times
Paul Weiss lawyers suggest in their client release that demonstrating that the new-money pricing is based on market terms via expert evidence, or evidence of market testing, may not be as easy as it sounds. “Since it is typical for negotiations with creditors aimed at reaching a consensual solution to commence at an early stage of financial distress, deal terms are likely to be largely agreed upon prior to any provider of valuation evidence being substantially progressed in their work, or even engaged,” they note.

As for market testing, they point out that running a market testing process for new money in a European restructuring context is not an established practice — in contrast to the US, where there is a mature and competitive market for DIP financing in Chapter 11 cases.

Moreover, different investors have different target returns, depending on their own circumstances. Hogan Lovells lawyers point out that there will be an inevitable difference of view between distressed investors seeking opportunities to deploy capital and what an out-of-the-money compromised creditor thinks can be obtained in the market for a restructured business.

When it comes to justifying the cost of the new money, the goal will be to reach a high level of conviction as to how the returns on the new money compare to what the restructured company could obtain on the market, Natalie Blanc says. “The way most companies are likely to do this will be to seek expert evidence, but it is also possible that out-of-the-money creditors will provide their own expert evidence to make their case, which could lead to expert evidence battles before the court,” she expects.

Ultimately, restructuring practitioners may need some extra guidance — particularly over what constitutes a fair allocation of the restructuring benefits. “We need more examples to see how the court makes that assessment,” said Lisa Rickelton, a senior managing director in the restructuring practice at FTI Consulting.

Benefits report
In the meantime, companies submitting RPs can provide more expert evidence. In the recent case for Independent Builders Merchants Group (IBMG, part of the Turbo Group), a “Plan Benefits Report” prepared by Grant Thornton was presented to the court. Macfarlanes lawyers, who advised IBMG, said that a “Plan Benefits Report” should be a standard part of the evidence provided for any future restructuring plan, likely forming part of the expert analysis in relation to the relevant alternative.

FTI’s Rickelton echoes that view, and suggests more companies are likely to submit a “Plan Benefits Report” going forward.

Other refinements are likely to follow — through court cases and also initiatives such as the revision of practice statements for restructuring plans and schemes, launched in May and expected to be finalized shortly.

“The restructuring market is nimble and will adapt to accommodate the concerns expressed by the judges in what is becoming a fast-developing body of case law,” says John Houghton, head of Greenberg Traurig’s London Restructuring Practice and co-head of the firm’s global practice, recalling that this happened with the Adler case. “The Petrofac case is certainly not an existential threat to the future of restructuring plans.”

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