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Podcast

On the podcast: The venture debt playbook

As the markets have turned south, venture debt seems to have become all the rage. But how many startups are actually raising it?


As the markets have turned south, venture debt seems to have become all the rage. But how many startups are actually raising it?

This week, Armentum managing partner John Markell joins the podcast to unpack the world of venture debt. Markell shares his thoughts on how venture lenders go about underwriting young companies, why investors are souring on the consumer market, how venture debt differs from structured equity, and which types of startups should—or really shouldn’t—raise debt. Plus, PitchBook financial writer Marina Temkin and PitchBook senior editor James Thorne discuss their latest coverage of VC valuations and the fallout at FTX.

In this episode of Sapphire Ventures’ series “GameChangers,” Sapphire partner and Head of Revenue Excellence Karan Singh speaks with Forter’s Chief Revenue Officer Marcus Holm about unlocking seller productivity and repeatability through value realization methodologies.

Listen to all of Season 6, presented by Sapphire Ventures, and subscribe to get future episodes of “In Visible Capital” on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts or wherever you listen. For inquiries, please contact us at [email protected].

Transcript

Marina Temkin: Hi, John. Welcome to the “In Visible Capital” podcast. Today, we’re going to be discussing venture debt. Could you please introduce yourself, your firm Armentum, and what role you play in the venture debt universe?

John Markell: Thanks, Marina. My name’s John Markell. I’m a managing partner at Armentum Partners. The role we play in the venture debt universe is we are advisers to technology and healthcare companies that are looking to raise venture debt as part of their capital-raising strategies. We help them raise the debt they want at terms that are optimized for their needs.

Marina: How long have you been around, and how has the venture debt landscape changed over those years?

John: We, as a firm, have been around for a little over, I want to say in earnest, about 11 years. Chris Carthy and I started the firm. Chris had started on the healthcare side. I started on the tech side. The market’s changed a lot, is the short answer. I guess part of this interview is to talk about how, but probably the most obvious thing to us is just awareness that venture debt is a funding tool for companies that they hadn’t previously thought.

Under the awareness category, I think companies now have a better understanding that it’s not just, “Oh my gosh, they’re going to take the keys to the company,” [and] that it’s actually quite a friendly funding tool.

Marina: I understand that there’s been a lot of new players that have entered the market over those years. Why are there new entrants into venture debt?

John: This is where I could take one of two tacks. One is because we’ve been doing our job, and we’re yelling from the rooftop the value of the asset class. That’s probably a tiny little part. But in reality, I believe it’s because venture debt as an asset class under the category of private credit is really attractive from a risk-reward perspective.

I think, even to this day, it’s not intuitive to a lot of the new entrants. I think because the word venture is associated with it, and because it’s so closely tied to venture capital, where they read article after article about how venture capital firms make their funds on one, two, three investments out of 20. There’s this, perhaps incorrect leap or assumption that venture debt must be almost as risky.

That’s simply not the case. I think the data has shown that it’s actually quite a safe asset class. Loss rates, certainly for, I’m going to say the most active 30 venture debt lenders, are below mid-market cash flow lending loss rates, and the returns are higher. Some of the larger credit funds look at this and go, “Gee, why aren’t we in this?”

Marina: I also understand that part of the reason there has been a lot more interest in the asset class, other than it turned out to be a rather safe, surprisingly safe, and surprisingly lucrative asset class, is that the sizes of the loans have increased tremendously over the years. Did that happen inline with the venture universe growing, or is there something else at play? Are startups more open to taking on more debt? Does that usually happen with the blessing of their venture capitalists?

John: There’s a lot to address there and unpack. I think one of the overarching drivers of loan sizes and just venture volumes increasing has happened because it’s piggybacked off of just private credit generally increasing. If you look at private credit today versus 10 years ago, it’s like 7x or 8x or even more. I don’t even know the data. It’s crazy. I just know that it’s straight up. That’s one factor. The other factor is the venture debt product or products have evolved to better suit the various borrowers of those products.

When we started in this business a little over a decade ago, I used to use the analogy that each lender’s widget was their term sheet. Like Apple sells this. This is what they sell, and they sell a phone. A lender sells a term sheet, and that term sheet, by and large, looks kind of the same for most deals. They tweak it on the edges, but years ago, the term sheet that you’d get from Pick a Lender, Hercules, TriplePoint, WTI, or whatever, it kind of looked the same for an ecommerce company as it did for an adtech company as it did for an enterprise software company.

As the market evolved, new entrants came in. Those loan products also evolved to fit the use case, the need, the risk. I think that was happening on the product side. On the, call it, ecosystem side, you had more and more venture capital firms, like the investors in these portfolio companies, getting a lot more comfortable with the venture lenders. They were realizing that, hey, these lenders aren’t just going to say, “Give me the keys to the company.” They really don’t have any interest in owning the company, and I think most venture debt lenders will identify themselves as relationship lenders.

It’s this approach that I think the venture debt firms have taken with those investors to say, “Hey, we have a problem. What can we do to fix it?” As opposed to consulting the loan and security agreement saying, “This is what we must do here, because it says we need to do this here.” There was a lot more, I’m going to call it, relationship furtherance between venture debt lender and venture capital investor broadly in the market, such that, “Okay, then maybe we can put a little bit more leverage on the company. Maybe we can put a little bit more leverage on the company.”

We still believe in many cases, companies are safely levered because of this phenomenon, if you want to call it a phenomenon. I think that’s a big part of why borrowers are borrowing more, or why they’re able to borrow more, because the product has evolved to fit the situation a little bit.

Marina: Broadly speaking, how do venture lenders make decisions about the creditworthiness of a startup, because all the startups, for the most part, are cash flow negative. In traditional lending, you’re either lending against assets of the company or cash flows of the company. For the most part, startups don’t have either of those.

John: Right. The way we simply view the lending world is, there are three types of loans, but like you mentioned, two of them you mentioned. There’s cash flow loans, which the underwriting is predicated on the lender’s view that the company will have enough cash flow to sustain and then ultimately repay the loan. Asset-based lending, where the underwriting is based on assuming that an orderly liquidation of the assets exceeds, the value that’s received from that, exceeds the value of the loan.

Then the third type is mostly where we spend our time and which is how venture debt define what’s called enterprise value lending. Enterprise value lending isn’t quite as neatly defined the way the other types of lending are. With enterprise value lending, lenders are generally looking for, not just an underwriting anchor to get comfortable with but perhaps a couple of things that together constitute an underwriting anchor. The best proxy is, “Well, what was the last valuation?”

The other thing is, does the IP have value, and not so much in the context of does it have value where we can offensively enforce any infringers, but rather, is this IP worth something to someone else if they were to acquire it?

IP is sort of a weird thing in that there’s no defined value for it. It’s worth as much as someone’s willing to pay for it. Those are just some examples of how lenders will get comfortable doing enterprise value lending. I should probably note, that type of analysis varies depending on the stage. When we’re talking to clients who haven’t done this before or have done it a few times, a venture debt loan being underwritten for a company that is, call it, Series E or pre-IPO, the underwriting is going to be very different than a Series A.

We always say it’s a two-pronged approach, where one prong is the lenders going through and trying to ascertain the inherent creditworthiness of the business itself. The other prong is, “Okay, who’s in the equity syndicate? What was their underwriting thesis? Is there more capital from this equity syndicate?”

In other words, they’re assessing future financing risk from the parties already involved in the business, and they ascribe value to that. A Series A company, they’re going to ascribe a lot of value to that latter prong. A Series E type of company, they’re going to ascribe much less value to that latter prong and more value to the inherent creditworthiness in business, so it shifts over time.

Marina: From what I understand is that historically, venture debt, and correct me if I’m wrong if this was more on the early-stage side, historically, it followed a venture equity round. But this year, there’s been a downturn in the public markets and venture capitalists retreated and they’re much more reluctant to fund startups, partially because of valuation having fallen. A lot of startups have turned to venture debt to extend their runway. But at the same time, those financings are not done following a venture equity round. How has that changed? What are the considerations for lenders in this current market?

John: I wouldn’t say it’s actually changed so much as the timing that they follow has changed a little bit. You’re right. Historically, especially on the healthcare side, most venture debt deals were done on the heels of an equity raise. You had a fresh valuation, you had a healthy balance sheet, and the adage of, “It’s best to get a line of credit in place when you don’t need one,” that followed, so that it would underwrite that way.

But as the market evolved, as both borrowers and their investors got more comfortable taking on debt, and venture debt lenders got more savvy in terms of how to structure their product to match the risk and use case, the time between or time after that last equity round to the next equity round, or if there’s no equity round, has changed. A big part of that is, I think, lenders are looking a little bit more into what’s the money going to be used for, what’s the risk, and we always tell clients, “Venture debt is great if the money is going to be used to do more of the same thing that you’re already doing.”

In other words, it’s great for sales and marketing risk in markets that you already know, and you have data for. It’s terrible for R&D, it’s terrible for product risk or R&D risk, it’s terrible for just pure cash burn to pay senior management. It’s really a question of what is debt capital best used for from a risk assessment perspective. So, that’s helped.

I think one of the things that is sort of prompting this question, I mean, I’m not in your head, but I think one of the things prompting the question is you’re hearing about venture debt a lot more often. In this particular market, and in, I’m going to say downturns in the past, so think early to mid-2020, early 2016, middle of 2014, where there have been periods where equity valuations have gyrated a little bit, and there’s been uncertainty as to, “Hey what’s equity funding is going look like?”.

By extension, indirect extension, is a lot of the businesses that are well funded, they basically size up their market and go, OK, in periods when funding is going to be tight, there’s going to be haves and have-nots. There’s going to be a broader divide between the quality of companies within that domain.

I think what you’re seeing now is a gap that’s widening rapidly. A lot of those businesses that are well capitalized, either because they just raised a round, or maybe they raised a whole bunch of 2021, and just happened to time things right, and just happened to focus more on margin right. In other words, they have a healthy balance sheet today, however it got there, so be it, but they have a healthy balance sheet today.

A lot of the debt that’s being raised today is around, “Hey, we think we’re one of the healthier in our sectors. We want to be opportunistic, and either raise money to do M&A where we have stuff already lined up ... or, we’re just really prudent and if we can raise money today, we’re going to because we can.” As you can imagine, the high prudence and health are probably strongly correlated.

We’re seeing a lot of that today. It’s not necessarily following a very near venture capital round. Does that answer your question?

Marina: Yes, I think it does. A follow-up question is that, I understand from a lot of VCs, is that they’ve said that venture debt has saved the day for many of the portfolio companies, meaning that some of the portfolio companies had maybe [have] less than a year of runway left, and they went out and raised venture debt and now they have 18 months or two years, something that VCs have been advising in this downturn. Do you think some of the companies that raise debt recently are at a higher risk of default? I also know that there’s a cohort of VCs that are saying, “Venture debt is not the best product for certain companies.”

John: I’m an engineer with a math degree. Is raising debt now higher risk than before? No, because the cost of capital has gone up across the board and it’s a risk-adjusted cost of capital perspective. Yes, interest rates have risen, spreads have risen, but on a risk-adjusted basis, from a math perspective, no, risk hasn’t increased. From a qualitative aspect in terms of, is now the right time to raise debt? I can’t answer that question. I’m not sure any VC is able to ascertain that question in general. With specific companies, of course, they have the expertise of what their companies are doing.

I think it’s very hard to just say, across the board, now’s not a good time for companies to be raising venture debt. The way we see it, let me focus on the words you use there, which was some folks have said venture debt has saved their companies. Let’s look at the extreme cases. We don’t actually advise on many of the extreme cases. By extreme case, I mean, something where the company’s balance sheet has 12 months of runway or less or something, and the equity syndicate is tapped out or doesn’t want to invest, or whatever the reason, the company can’t raise equity from insiders.

The company basically has three options. One, they can go to outside equity, they’re going to take a down round, it’s going to hurt. Our experience has been that most insiders will fight that as much as possible unless they’ve written off the business. The reason I say our experience is that’s usually when we get a call from insiders. That’s one option, they can do that, take punitive equity.

The second option is they can raise debt and hope that that capital allows them to live to fight another day. The third option is they just fold, and they try to sell the business, or they run out of money or whatever.

The third option is not really-- That’s going to start happening. You’re starting to see or we’re starting to hear businesses saying, “Well, we have an adviser, and they’re exploring all options.” That’s code speak for we’re trying to get bought. We’ve seen that, but in the second case where the company doesn’t really have many options, sure, there have been some lenders that have said, “Yes, we think this is a viable business, it’s too bad, because of when the rounds were structured, that it was way overvalued, but it could still be a very good debt investment.”

There’s lots of businesses out there that are wonderful debt investments, and terrible equity investments if they just carry on the equity trajectory that they were on. In some of those cases, yes, that’s been sort of a lifeline for them. I think if you take the view that, “Oh, this is really dangerous, we shouldn’t do this.” Maybe it’s just kicking the can down the road. Time changes a lot of things. I’m not suggesting you take on debt without a plan, but in the cases where it’s been successful, there’s been a plan, and it has helped companies.

Now all that said, very few lenders want their capital to be an explicit alternative to equity. Remember my comment earlier about that they don’t want to be cash burn healing, they don’t want to be product or R&D risk and like that. A lot of lenders don’t see their money as being a good alternative to equity for that, but every now and again, in some cases, it’s a liquidity problem due to a working capital problem, or they need some capital to convert a couple of contracts that are locked in signed, again, that comes down to working capital problem. Those situations are ones where lenders will go, “Okay, we’ll dig in and look at this, we think we can do something.”

What we have seen, more often than you’d think intuitively, are situations where a company has venture debt already on its books, and it’s been there for a while, and it’s with a lender that knows the business really well, and the business is struggling for whatever reason, or contracts are coming in, but they’re coming in later than they want and they’re running out of cash and they need more capital. We’ve seen situations where the lender has been the one, the existing lender said, “We’ll put more capital in.” We will be, not rescuing financing because that’s a defined term, but we will be that next dollar that bridges you to the sale or bridges you to a more significant equity round where it’s an evaluation.

We’ve seen that quite a bit. We actually track that stuff. We track lender behavior, how they act in problem situations, in opportunistic situations, [and] in great situations. Do they proactively say, “Hey, we’re going to improve the terms here and give you more money”? Stuff like that. We monitor and track all that. We have seen situations where it has been very helpful to the borrower for existing loans.

Marina: Let’s talk about pricing in this environment. Interest rates are obviously going up. From what I understand, there may be an increase in risk. I think that’s what I’m hearing you say, because obviously companies are less likely to have a next round of venture capital down the line, so how have those two things impacted pricing?

John: I would actually say those two things have impacted pricing, but not as much as other things have impacted pricing in our observation. Let me just preface this by saying on our pipeline call on Monday, we decided that we’re going to run like a formal exercise to see-- Our firm sees between 300 and 500 term sheets a year from 250 different lenders. So to say we have a good idea of where the market is is an understatement. We’re very on top of that stuff.

On the healthcare side of the market, we’re only now seeing pricing changes, notwithstanding rate hikes. On the tech side of our business, we saw a almost instantaneous jump, like an immediate sort of step-function jump in pricing about two months ago, and we’re running this exercise now to figure out exactly what that pricing jump was.

I don’t have data I can stand behind right now on this, but for us—just anecdotally and all this sort of stuff we see—on the tech side of our business, which is probably what most of the audience would be interested in, we’re seeing pricing jump between 150 and 300 basis points above rate hikes, like in addition to rate hikes, but we’re still collecting the data on that. We think there have been, I’m going to say, three significant contributors to that and I guess all of it you could ascribe all the way up as risk changing.

The first big contributor is a lot of the venture debt funds, mainly the smaller, more active funds like Eastward capital, Hercules, Avenue Capital’s not small, but Avenue Capital, Runway Capital. A lot of these businesses with dedicated funds, they’ve deployed more capital this year than they expected to, just as part of their regular fundraising cycle.

So as we get toward year-end, their bar for what they’re going to invest in has risen because they’ve already deployed their quota, so to speak. They’ve deployed, I’m not using the right terminology and I certainly am not in those worlds, but we talk with these folks every day. That’s one aspect of it that’s brought pricing up. The bar’s risen because there’s just less capital from, I’m going to say, the traditional venture debt lenders.

The second big contributor has been that a lot of these larger funds, the asset managers, so the Blackstones, the BlackRocks, the AllianceBernsteins, the Apollos, those larger funds where they have dedicated venture lending. BlackRock is a great example. They have a sort of a dedicated venture debt group that came out of the old, their acquisition of Tennenbaum Capital four years ago, I think.

Last year, we would do a deal, it might be a $275 million deal, and BlackRock would say, “Oh, we’re going to hold $150 million of it or whatever, or $200 million of it,” or something like that. Hold sizes have dropped at some of these. There are a handful of large asset managers who have said, “No, no, no, our hold sizes are up. We just raised a big fund,” like Sixth Street for example, but by and large, [for] a lot of them, hold sizes have dropped. There’s just simply put, there’s less money in the system.

There’s also less of a push from LPs to deploy debt capital than there was a year ago, so there’s less urgency. The third thing is consumer right now is a pariah. We have seen a, what seems to us as is an irrational pullback from all things consumer ecommerce. Lenders that traditionally or historically would look at ecommerce deals or consumer deals and say, “Oh, we like that,” or whatever. They’re not looking at them at all. I’m not saying they’ve raised the bar. I’m saying it’s, they’re not looking at them at all.

Marina: Are you saying that consumer businesses are really considered quite, quite risky?

John: Actions speak louder than words. That’s the action that is telling us that these lenders think is the case. They think they’re far more risky. Part of how I’m spending my time now is talking to heads of credit saying, “Why? Why do you think that?”. This is a one-month, two-month-old phenomena that we’re like, “Wait, you’re not-- You’ve done a bunch of consumer deals, why aren’t you doing it anymore?”. “Well, no, we’re not touching consumer.” “Well, why not?” “Well, if I take this to my IC, I’m going to get shot.” “Well, why are you going to get shot?” “Because my IC told me no more consumer.” “Well, why?” “Well, they just told us no more consumer.” That’s a discussion we’re having a lot.

Marina: Who’s an IC?

John: Pardon me. Investment committee. Credit committee, investment committee.

Marina: So, they’re not giving you a direct explanation why they’re seeing consumers a very risky sector.

John: Yes. Some lenders are. Some lenders are saying, “Our bar is higher for consumer. Here’s why. We’re overweight in consumer.” There’s rational reasons for that, and some are not. Some we’re just, “No, we’re not touching it. Not for us.” At the risk of sounding salesy, part of our role, sitting in between the borrower and the lender, is to minimize everyone’s time and resource usage. In some situations where we believe the lender’s not going to be competitive or something like that, we don’t push for feedback per se, in others we do. We’re like, “Hey, why is this?” Our asset is information.

We get all of our information from the market and in many of these situations, it just has not been the best use of the lender’s time to educate me on how their credit committee thinks. Even though we already have kind of an idea in many respects ... We just haven’t pushed, and that’s why I say I’m starting to go, “OK, maybe we should start pushing a little bit, because we think it’ll actually help them.”

Marina: Two questions I have left. One is, how does venture debt differ from structured equity, and are you seeing those two in competition at the moment?

John: The answer to the second question is sure, yes, sure. The Arctic Wolf deal, they receive from a lender, here’s a convert, structured equity, call it whatever you want. Here’s a plain vanilla debt. The borrower took the convert. So yes, they’re in competition. All capital’s always in competition with a client and they usually have to work through what’s best for the company in terms of taking on the capital and how they think it’s going to convert into higher dollars and better return for the business. That’s an ongoing exercise that companies have to do.

Your first question, what’s the difference between structured equity and venture debt, at the risk of sounding and glib or cute, structured equity is just that it’s equity, it’s not debt.

Now US gap is the only accounting system in the world where certain types of preferred equity that have an accrual and a liquidation preference and a term on it is not counted as debt, it counts as equity. A lot of the structured equity that’s being deployed now, whether if it’s convertible debt, I think a lot of people get confused and say, “Oh, well this is debt.” Sure, it’s debt for a period of time, but really, it’s underwritten by the lender investor in the hopes that it’ll convert because that’s where all the upside is.

It helps that lender stay high enough on the seniority stack that if they have to hit the company over the head with a hammer, they will but the expectation is that it’ll convert and there’ll be more upside.

Venture debt is debt. There’s the expectation that it’ll be repaid at a certain time. If you look at some of these structures, the structured equity stuff is, where the company’s awake, is quite loose in terms of covenants and stuff. We’ve seen some like PIPEs and stuff going to pre-SPACs where it’s been brutally punitive and tight and that’s just I don’t know what the advisers were doing there. We’ve seen some of that but that’s more off-market. Generally speaking, it’s a looser form of capital.

With venture debt—especially for the later-stage companies where they have options of different types of capital—there’s an expectation that the lender’s going to run into problems. Approximately 77% of venture debt deals undergo a covenant breach. A venture debt lender, unlike a convert lender, is walking into the situation with an expectation that there’s going to be a problem and they underwrite accordingly, which I think from a qualitative or underwriting view, with a convert, they have to plan for that, but they certainly don’t underwrite with the expectation that there’s going to be all kinds of problems. It’s a little bit of a different approach.

Marina: Yes, that makes sense.

John: The other thing too. I think we talked about this earlier, structured equity, converts, whatever you want to call it, is quite in vogue right now because you can raise equity without having to look at yourself in the mirror and say, “OK, this is what my valuation is today.” You can kick that can down the road. This is going to convert at 20% of your next material equity financing or at a discount, or it’s going to be at a 10% premium to your last round that was more than three years ago. So, it pegs to some future or past valuation without having to say what the company’s valued at today.

In some companies, they kind of like that. They are kind of like, “I don’t want to have to look at myself in the mirror right now and admit that we’re down,” and I would think some investors maybe kind of like that too. Remember your question earlier about, has debt saved companies in the past? They convert structured equity. It’s not a whole lot different. It’s kicking the can down the road of something that has to happen, which is, “What are we worth?”

Marina: In venture debt, there isn’t any valuation set either, right?

John: Not really. Venture debt usually comes with warrants and those warrants, market terms for warrants are always, we’re going to have warrants at X percent of the loan coverage and the warrants are going to strike at whatever the more favorable is of the last round or the next round.

When they’re structuring the deal, there isn’t a huge emphasis on valuation for purposes of defining their return, but rather for underwriting. It’s more on what do we think this is worth in a liquidation scenario, not in an upside scenario.

Marina: Got it. Everyone is talking about how venture debt is booming right now, and it’s such a great alternative to venture capital now that venture capitalists have receded. However, what I’ve noticed is that after a very strong Q2, we have very, very weak Q3 numbers. They’re some of the lowest venture debt value and count numbers since mid-2017. How do you explain the decline?

John: A couple things. That’s consistent with what we’re seeing as well. If you think about stuff that’s closing and when things actually get measured, there’s a delay. We always tell clients that from launching a deal, so from the time the client decides we need to go raise venture debt to the time it hits their balance sheet, it’s anywhere from 60 to 90 days. If companies are doing it themselves, excluding bank financing, it’s longer than that.

If you put a one-quarter lag on when venture debt closes and when you see it and when it gets measured, that tells us that in Q1, companies are like, we need to raise venture debt ... At the end of Q1, late March is when valuations really started to decline precipitously. The most prudent of companies said, I can raise debt now I’m going to do that.

There was a flood of what I’ll call the highest-quality companies coming to market for venture debt. Those deals closed in Q2, it’s showing up in your stats. Meanwhile, move forward a quarter, equity value is going. The next, I don’t want to be disparaging, but the next cohort of companies, either by way of optimism, lack of prudence, or function of when they raised their last equity round says, “Hey, we should probably raise some debt as well.” They come to market in Q2.

They’re the ones that they’re kind of, I’m going to say, in between in that they’re very financeable. They may not necessarily need the money, but they’re asking for it. Those are the ones that hit the market middle of Q2 to late Q2. They’re also toward the end of Q2, you also had, I’ll call it the third rung of companies saying, “Holy crap, we need money.”

Meanwhile, from the lender’s perspective—remember when I said a lot of that traditional venture lenders, they’ve been deploying capital faster than they thought? We know some lenders that at the end of June said, “We’re done for the year. We’ve deployed more capital than we expected.” So that cohort that you had seen close a bunch in second quarter that decide in first quarter, the lenders have deployed a bunch of capital.

By the time the companies that come to market in the second quarter—especially toward the end of the second quarter, early in the third quarter—by the time those companies come to market for traditional venture debt, the lenders have already, like a lot of capital’s been deployed, their bar is naturally higher. It’s a lot hard to do a deal. Deals are taking longer. You’re seeing less closing.

The stuff that is closing is the opportunistic M&A. The companies that have really, really healthy balance sheets and don’t need the capital but want to be opportunistic. That stuff’s still closing. That stuff’s showing up in your stats. That’s the stuff that’s keeping us busy right now as well. I think what you’re going to find is Q4 is even less, based on what we’re seeing. A lot of those originators that I talked about that weren’t going to go to their IC, they’ve made their bonus for the year.

You take something that’s consumer or whatever, a little riskier in Q3, or like that went to market Q3, or even now, we’re in Q4. There’s almost zero incentive for an originator to go, “Why am I going to take on this deal? I already have my bonus. All these different fun things. Why am I getting into this?” Notwithstanding what’s happening in the broader market. That’s like on top of. We’re not surprised by this. What we do think will happen is there’ll be an about-face in Q1.

Marina: What do you mean by about-face? Are lenders are going to come back to market?

John: The clock resets, happens every year.

Marina: This is a normal trajectory even though this year, it may be a little bit more.

John: There definitely is a cyclicality for lenders’ urgency to getting deals closed and what they’ll look at in their pipeline and what they won’t, and a lot of it is around their fund cycle, if they’re BDCs, when the quarter’s ending, that sort of stuff. There’s definitely exogenous forces that dictate how far down the credit spectrum they’re willing to go.

Marina: Great. Thank you, John. Thank you for coming on the “In Visible Capital” podcast.

John: You’re welcome, and thank you for having me.

In this episode

John Markell headshot

John Markell
Managing Partner, Armentum Partners


John has over 15 years technology industry experience having worked as an engineer, project manager and investment banker. He has been involved in numerous debt, equity, and merger and acquisition transactions in the technology industry. John previously worked at investment bank Seven Hills Partners in San Francisco, at CIBC World Markets in Toronto and New York in the Technology, Media & Telecom and Debt Capital Markets Groups, and at JP Morgan in New York in the Fixed Income Group. John is also a licensed professional engineer. John received his Master of Business Administration in finance from the Schulich School of Business at York University and his Bachelor of Science in engineering and mathematics from Queen’s University.

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Karan Singh: Welcome to our segment of the program that we’re calling “Game Changers,” where we’ll explore how the best revenue leaders have transformed their company’s growth trajectory. I’m your host, Karan Singh, partner and leader of the revenue excellence function at Sapphire Ventures. Joining me today is Marcus Holm, CRO at Forter, Cloud 100 company in the fraud protection and prevention space. Marcus, great to have you joining us.

Marcus Holm: Likewise Karan. Thanks for having me as part of your debut podcast. It’s a distinct pleasure to be with you.

Karan: Let’s jump right into it, Marcus. We’ve interacted in past lives. We worked together in the past and one of the things that I loved about you is, you can always smell and sense when somebody has revenue in their DNA. What was your aha moment?

Marcus: It’s sort of in the DNA, Karan. I was shaped by my environment in childhood where I was part of a large family of 11 kids. My father was a professional sales trainer, part of Max Sachs International, doing track selling. So it was a seven-step process on how you find a prospect, build rapport, qualify and close a deal. And so ironically in middle and high school I would tag along to these seminars and learn about sales process end-to-end.

And my dad had a strong influence over me in terms of meritocracy and understanding human psychology. And through high school was selling electronics at Super Target, trying to convince people to buy Playstations and cameras and upsell the best I could. And then following my high school sales career, I went door to door in Eastern Europe. And so going through university I recognized, you know what, I have a real knack for this. I enjoy the human psychology of problem solving and solutions. And so that’s kind of what put me on this trajectory to stay in sales.

Karan: That is amazing. I knew there was something unique about you. Now I know it’s you were value-selling, following a structured sales process in your teenage years. So my goodness, it is absolutely a part of your DNA. What a journey. Let’s get it in the meat of it. And I have a feeling I know what your game changer is going to be. If you had to boil it down to that one thing, that one initiative, that one best practice that changed the game for you, what would that be?

Marcus: I think the consistent theme throughout my sales career has been focusing on value realization. So it didn’t matter if it was B2C sales in residential neighborhoods where the benefits were different for maybe a child versus an adult, a man versus a woman, an elderly, they all had different things that appealed to them. So doing proper discovery to then figure out the benefits of their situation was critical to landing a sale.

So I think when I finished the university and transitioned to business to business large enterprise sales, I quickly came to realize that the human psychology is consistent. Whether it’s a CFO or CDO wanting to buy something, that’s the same person who I was selling to prior on their couch as they want a TV service. And so you need to make sure that you understand who are the key stakeholders that are involved in the decision making process. Because sometimes it might just be a husband and wife because changing TV service is easy.

However, if I want to engage with a Fortune 500 retailer, I’m going to have to focus on a consensus sale where there’s a lot of stakeholders with influence into the decision and then figure out how to quantify the impact and the perceived ROI of my solution to the individual areas, so that as they go through and you look at this popularity contest or the bandwagon effect of who are they mostly all going to nod at and it comes down to a vote more or less in these large enterprises, that you come outstanding differentiated.

Because most competitors and or salespeople tend to get single-threaded. But to do value realization effectively, you have to be very multi-threaded and ensure you have a comprehensive readout of what matters most to the whole organization. Because if you can solve multiple things simultaneously, you can demand a higher ticket price, you can have a faster sales cycle, and you can have a higher conversion rate.

Karan: Value realization is not a new concept. I mean heck, you were doing it in high school, right? So it’s been around for a while. How have you translated what is a very, I think, very relevant concept to your teams? What have you done to disseminate that knowledge to everybody else because that’s right, the trick of the trade? I’m curious what best practices have you used on the same?

Marcus: Hire a few rock stars and they can will their way to victory. They instinctively know what to do, they’re creatures of habit and they can just play off of that to finding closed deals. I think as you scale to a later stage pre-IPO company like Forter, you come to recognize the importance of standardization because it’s the lowest common denominator of how can I simplify the message and the sales plays to a place where now I can have it replicated across tens or hundreds of sales reps invest heavily into enablement both in the plays, so the content of who are the target personas, what are the sales plays we want to run at those different personas? What is the process from sales stage one to seven? What’s the qualification framework that we want to standardize on? Really trying to take the learnings of your rockstar reps, package them up in a repeatable way and make them available for us as a security company.

There’s a similar opportunity to decide whether you want to sell on fear of loss or desire for gain. If you sell based, if you sell based on fear of loss, you’re typically going to be focused exclusively on a security persona or like a fraud prevention persona. In our case, when you’re selling to a lot of retailers, however, if you also orient yourself towards what’s there to gain, you get access to and relevance with the chief digital officer, chief financial officer, because you can focus more on revenue maximization, improve customer experience, how do you increase conversion rates and let as many shoppers as possible shop on your website?

And so I think it’s important that you flush out the different value drivers of make them more money, save them money or keep them out of jail. And I think that as a security company, if you can do all of those, it gets you access to increasing or an additional number of buying centers. I can also get you a much more compelling ROI story because it’s not just a bottom line savings play, but it’s a top line growth story as well.

Karan: Makes a ton of sense. You know what I love about your statement, too, is it’s clearly a company-wide initiative. This is not just a sales people sitting in the corner trying to go figure it out by themselves, although I think they are the tip of the spear, right? So you’re starting with your best and brightest and learning from them, but then galvanizing the entire company together to change the messaging, change the perspective, all that. And then using that to drive, like you said, canonize us across the organization. I’m curious, did you see a change in your KPIs, in retention or I mean give me a sense, have you seen a change? And I’m also curious maybe a two-part question. How long do you think it takes before something like this actually really fits in the DNA of the organization so you will see that change? What do you think that looks like?

Marcus: So short answer is yes. We have seen improvements across our key KPIs. So as I look at the sales team, we’re tracking things like ramp time to get on the board with the first deal, conversion rates. What X pipeline do they need for coverage to ensure that they can hit their quota? Cause it’s pretty common in our industries to have three to five X. So if you can be closer to three X, that’s great because that means you have a higher win rate, you don’t have to have as much top line coverage, also average deal size. And so if we look at our key metrics there plus the critical rep productivity metric of you ideally want to get all least half your sales team achieving their regular quotas to limit attrition and turnover and then frankly also to control your costs because turnover is a super-expensive proposition as you ramp new people.

And so I think the investments we’ve made have paid off along those key metrics. Are we to where we want to be ultimately? Not yet. I mean we’re still working tweaks out, which is to your second question, I think you knew the answer, your leading question, that it’s a multi-year journey. I mean I think it is a company transformation in the early days of focusing on value realization because you’re interviewing all the stakeholders across the company. The founders play a critical role in understanding what was the heritage of the solution, why are we doing it, how do we do it better than the alternatives?

You’re interviewing the support team to understand what are customers challenged with. The product team, to understand what are we building for and what’s our direction and our vision for the future. And so when you’re doing a command of the message type framework that you now have gone through together, you look at some of these industry standard frameworks of really trying to hone in on the value drivers and the how we do its and how we do it betters and answer the three why’s, all these things.

It is absolutely a cross-company collaboration and I think there’s enough demonstrated evidence at this point based on the success of these IPOs, whether you’re looking at the snowflakes of the world, the [inaudible 00:08:35] of the world, the Crowdstrikes of the world, they’ve all followed a similar recipe, I think, of success. And so we’re not trying to reinvent the wheel but we’re trying our hardest to remain rigorous and adherent to those best practices.

Karan: You brought up a couple of top points and I want you to just speak a little bit more to this. So it’s a multi-year journey. I think we all understand that. I think conceptually there is a, and agree with it, and conceptually there’s absolutely a need for something like this and you see the best and brightest companies, but you’ll also find that there’s a lot of, especially early stage founders that may not be ready or willing or interested just yet in that transition to value selling because they’re beholden to the quarter, they’re beholden to the current pipeline and this transition takes a little bit of pain and suffering as well. So give some counsel to our audience, assume that there’s revenue leaders listening in and saying, “Hey, I want to go down this journey.” How did you pitch this to your leadership in Forter and in past lives? What would you suggest they do as part of their pitch as well to cement this concept in their leadership’s mind and get buy-in?

Marcus: Admittedly, I think this is the most important sale of revenue leader will make is the internal sale. I think there is a propensity for founders and early stage companies to under-invest and go to market, thinking that hey, if my product is super legit, it’ll sell itself or the phone will just ring because this stuff is so amazing and we’ll just hire some rainmaker, natural all star sales people and they can will their way to victory. It’s a dangerous path to go down.

I think in the early days, like series A, series B and I’ve had the pleasure of being a part of some of those, too. It’s really about AB testing. I would acknowledge look, you can’t really define super-repeatable rigorous process when you don’t even yet know how you’re going to position yourself in the market. The early days are defined by pressure testing your message with your intended personas to see how it lands and you sort of take your learnings from your losses and ideally get better to a place where you can pivot and drive those rates up. Here at Forter, similar to other places I’ve been, one of my initial priorities was in making the request to invest in sales process, sales qualification frameworks, different tools.

Because as you know, given all your operational experience, the tool chain can be quite expensive as well as you add these fixed costs. Anytime you make an ask of the business, you have to be prepared to follow similar process as you do externally. Quarter over quarter, you go to board meetings as a revenue leader, you have to be able to show the broader board team, here’s the starting place on those key metrics we mentioned earlier in this call, here’s how they’re trending quarter over quarter. And as you get positive leading indicators in early success, it begets more investment, because people are willing to further invest in places where they see some ROI coming.

They don’t want to keep throwing bad money after bad results or good money after bad results. And so I think that’s where here I’ve had to focus very heavily on trying to be data-driven, not emotionally driven. I think as long as you continue to educate founders in the journey and you show them it’s paying off, they’d be silly not to invest, that the deals are getting bigger, you’re closing more deals, the growth is accelerating. So that’s my biggest counsel, is just treat it like a natural sales process and don’t cut corners. Otherwise you won’t get the answer you want.

Karan: Share a little bit, what would you articulate as those leading indicators?

Marcus: What matters both in a high-growth business is you want to have high velocity in new logo acquisition. So how many new customers are we bringing on? What’s the average sales cycle length within our segmentation model? So for us, we have commercial mid-market, I have enterprise, I have strategic, so let’s pay attention to how we can condense those. And one can argue that if I have better enablements and I have better tools and I have just-in-time manufacturing of the right content to the right persona at the right time, these will help accelerate the deals as well as make them larger.

We pay attention to win rates. Understanding any worthwhile space is going to have a lot of competition. So you got to pay close attention to who you’re typically seeing in every deal. Who are you beating? Who are you losing to periodically and recalibrate that way.

Karan: Marcus, thank you. This is incredibly insightful. I know that our audience is going to get a ton of wisdom. I love to finish these conversations with a lightning round. Don’t think too hard, just your gut reaction for each. Great leaders pick great companies. How did you pressure test at Forter was a company to go to?

Marcus: So for me specifically I look at who are the investors? Are these tier one venture capital firms? Are these successful board members? I look at how compelling the founder problem fit is. What’s their origin story? Why are they trying to solve this problem? How’s my chemistry with them as founders? I look at things like the total adjustable market. I like disruptive plays where you’ve got a well-established legacy solution and it’s ripe for disruption. And I want to span verticals and market segments, not be overly niched. I look at Glassdoor reviews to get a sense for, is this a collaborative, enthusiastic, high-energy environment? As I looked at this particular opportunity at Forter, it checked all those boxes.

Karan: What would you share with others that are trying to make the transition to a leadership role from sales?

Marcus: It’s one of those inherent desires you need to have to help other people and to extend beyond yourself as far as your impact. During the pandemic and now I guess supposed recession we’re in, people are going through some hard personal problems and challenges, right? There’s a lot of emotional distress, there’s a lot of anxiety. As a leader, you got to be prepared to be a little bit of a therapist, show empathy for the adversity that your team is going through.

Karan: What’s the biggest misconception about our discipline?

Marcus: I think there’s commonly a perception of, it’s all about relationships. No, that’s part of it, but you better build a leak-proof enough business case that when it gets passed around 15 times, the people who don’t know you still rubber stamp it. Because you can’t possibly get access to all the relevant stakeholders. Sales people and revenue leaders have to be intelligent, they have to be thoughtful, they have to be analytical, they have to be prepared. You can’t just ad hoc wing it all the time. And so that’s what comes to mind for me.

Karan: What’s your big prediction for the future of revenue?

Marcus: One of the quotes I really like from Carl Eschenbach at Sequoia, who I’ve gotten to know well over the years, he’s sort of a career mentor and represents the trajectory I’m trying to follow myself. He talks a lot about how execution is a differentiator. Meaning we talk a lot about patents and IP and whose product is the best. And while that is important, there are common examples of tech history of an inferior product winning the market because they simply out-executed the competition.

And so I think when I think about revenue, IT leaders need to make sure that they recognize the potential impact execution can have. And that is, I think demonstrated by all the things we’ve talked about throughout this podcast. There’s a lot that goes into that. There’s a lot of things you have to build and operationalize and run with for your teams and if you fail to do that consistently, you’ll get out-flanked, I think.

Karan: Last one, and we’ll make this one a fun one. If you weren’t in revenue, what would you be doing?

Marcus: An exotic car salesperson. Because I love sports cars and the thought of sitting in a Ferrari or an Aston Martin dealership and taking people for test drives all day feels pretty utopian to me.

Karan: Amazing. Count me in on the exotic car sales as well, by the way. So birds of the feather. Well, listen, Marcus, this was amazing. Really grateful to you for sharing your wisdom, your counsel on value selling and just in general getting a little bit more knowledge about your background. This was a fun conversation. Appreciate you.

Marcus: Yeah, likewise. This is by far my most ambitious media product to date, Karan. So thank you for luring me out of my shell into the public domain. Wish you the best of luck with your future episode and it was a pleasure.

Karan: First of many. I’m Karan Singh and this has been an excerpt of the “Game Changers” podcast. To listen to the complete episode, please be sure to follow Sapphire Ventures on LinkedIn and @SapphireVC on Twitter. To get all the latest trends, best practices and resources from revenue operations experts for startup growth, subscribe to our RevOps newsletter, info.sapphireventures.com/subscribe.

Nothing presented herein is intended to constitute investment advice, and under no circumstances should any information provided herein be used or considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy an interest in any investment fund managed by Sapphire Ventures, LLC (“Sapphire”). Information provided reflects Sapphires’ views as of a particular time. Such views are subject to change at any point and Sapphire shall not be obligated to provide notice of any change. For more information, please visit Sapphires’ website at www.sapphireventures.com.

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