Last month, Y Combinator made a decision that would have been considered an investment heresy during the boom market. The accelerator, which helped incubate some of the strongest VC-backed businesses created over the last 15 years, including Airbnb, DoorDash and Stripe, said it’s pulling back from doubling down on its breakout portfolio companies when they reach the late stage.
Y Combinator began backing its best-performing mature startups in 2015 when it raised its first $700 million continuity fund. That strategy, which other firms refer to as opportunity or select funds, became popular with many early-stage VCs in the middle of the last decade. It proliferated through the pandemic years as company valuations grew and it became harder to maintain ownership in companies that had a shot at massive exits.
But as interest rates rose and publicly traded tech stocks plummeted last year, investing in mature startups became a lot less attractive. Late-stage investing has dropped, and early-stage investors suddenly found that fewer of their portfolio companies were on a path to receive large valuation step-ups. The result: Fewer opportunities for opportunity funds.
“I think we are coming to the tail end of the opportunity fund era,” said Chris Douvos, a managing director at Ahoy Capital, which invests in funds and startups. “I don’t think opportunity funds are a natural part of the ecosystem. Rather, they are symptoms of excess in the market that arose when capital was cheap.”
A total of $9.4 billion was raised across 70 VC funds that had the word “opportunity” or “select” in their name in 2022, according to PitchBook data. But only six such funds have been raised so far this year, and investors expect this figure to stay low for a while.
In addition to Y Combinator, which signaled it wouldn’t be raising more continuity funds, Felicis Ventures, which announced in March that it closed on $825 million for its ninth fund, didn’t explicitly earmark capital for follow-on opportunities. The firm, which is best known for investments in Shopify, Adyen and Credit Karma, raised a $600 million eighth early-stage fund and a $300 million opportunity fund in August 2021.
Laura Thompson, a partner at Sapphire Partners, an LP arm within Sapphire Ventures, said that firms are now going “back to basics” in their fundraising approach. “I think for some venture funds, opportunity funds often aren’t the basics and the core strategy,” she said.
While the strategy is out of favor, some firms are still able to raise opportunity funds. Last week, two firms—Canaan Partners and S2G Ventures—each raised new opportunity funds for backing breakaway companies in their portfolios. But those funds are likely an exception.
“If you haven’t raised an opportunity fund in the past, a net new opportunity fund is going to be very hard to raise in this current market,” Thompson said.
Although the concept of an opportunity fund has been around since at least the mid-2000s, it became popular during the last boom cycle as companies started to stay private for longer and their mortality rate declined significantly.
Early-stage firms found that they needed more capital in their reserves—a portion of the fund that’s retained for follow-on investments—for exercising their pro-rata right to maintain their ownership share in portfolio companies. Rather than raising larger main vehicles, many VC firms chose to raise separate funds targeted at their winning companies.
That strategy appealed to many LPs. Not only were they able to put more dollars to work with their favorite venture funds, but it also allowed them to fine-tune the risk profile of their investments. Since opportunity vehicles backed fast-growing scaled companies, those portfolios were perceived to be safer than earlier-stage ones.
Sneaking in AUM
Although Douvos said that he finds opportunity funds to be a “sneaky way” of growing assets under management while maintaining what looks like an appropriately sized early-stage fund, these late-stage vehicles aren’t totally without merit. “Sometimes companies become such a large part of your fund, but if they falter, it blows up your whole fund,” he said. "[An opportunity fund] lets managers lean into their highest conviction investments without screwing up the diversification of the early-stage vehicle.”
It also helped that many opportunity funds charged their LPs slightly lower management fees, which often began to accrue once the capital was drawn. Managers were happy to offer reduced pricing in part because they already knew the companies they were investing in and didn’t need to spend additional time on sourcing and diligence.
Kyle Stanford, a senior analyst at PitchBook, predicts that opportunity funds will be out of favor as long as the IPO market remains frozen and few exit opportunities are available. Since LPs are already overallocated to VC, GPs should be careful to avoid putting additional strain on them by raising these types of vehicles, he said.
“There’s probably a lot fewer companies that are likely to raise a new, huge up round now,” Stanford said.
But if such an opportunity comes, VCs can fund it from their reserves. Another option for managers is to raise a special purpose vehicle, which is essentially an opportunity fund for backing a specific company.
Since many opportunity funds invested in companies with high valuations, Douvos thinks a number of them will underperform the main funds. “LPs are going to be pretty upset about that, and as a result, GPs will be gun shy on opportunity funds for a while,” he said.
Related read: Global Private Market Fundraising Report
Featured image by Drew Sanders/PitchBook News
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